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Abstract
This paper develops a quantitative model of contagion of financial crisis and sovereign
default for small open economies that cannot credibly commit to honor their international
debts and have common risk averse investors. The existence of common investors with
preferences that exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) generates financial links
between the emerging economies’ sovereign debt markets. These links help to explain the
endogenous determination of credit limits, capital flows, and the risk premium in sovereign
bond prices as function not only of the economy’s fundamentals and the investors’ char-
acteristics (wealth and the degree of risk aversion), but more importantly as a function of
the fundamentals of other emerging economies. Therefore this paper provides a theoreti-
cal formalization for the endogenous explanation of the contagion of financial crises. The
model shows that whenever a country suffers a domestic shock that forces it to default,
the associated decrease in investor’s wealth will reduce her tolerance of risk; in turn her
investments in other emerging economies will be reduced, producing a contagion of the
crisis in those countries whose fundamentals are not solid. Also, even when a crisis in one
country does not force that country to default, the domestic shock affects the overall riski-
ness of the investor’s portfolio. Therefore the investor is forced to rebalance her portfolio.
In this case the investor moves away from countries that are “too” risky towards countries
that are relatively solid, exhibiting a behavior consistent with the observed phenomena de-
nominated as “flight to quality”. Quantitatively, the model is applied to the case of the
Argentinean default of 2001 and the posterior contagion of the crisis to the neighboring
country Uruguay. This application shows that the model presented in this paper is not only
consistent with the business cycle behavior of the emerging economies considered; but it is
also superior to models that do not contemplate financial links in several dimensions: i.)
the model explains a larger proportion and volatility of the spread between sovereign bonds
and riskless assets; ii.) the model explains endogenously the positive correlation between
the economies’ sovereign bonds spreads, debt flows and consumption, and iii.) the model
exhibits the behavior observed in the data of higher volatility and comovement of the series
of emerging economies during periods of volatility in financial markets prompted by a crisis
in some emerging country.
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1 Introduction
The last two decades of the 20th century can be described as a period of turbulence in
international capital markets. During this period the world has witnessed many currency
and financial crises. These crises can be characterized by the following stylized facts re-
garding emerging economies: a) the sudden loss of access to international capital markets,
b) large reversal of the current account deficit, c) a collapse of domestic production and
aggregate demand, and d) the simultaneous occurrence of these crises across countries. The
simultaneity of crises can be seen in Figure 1, which shows spikes in sovereign bond spreads
across several Latin American countries in the aftermath of the Mexican Crisis of 1994
and the Russian Crisis of 1998. The current paper is concerned with understanding why
simultaneous financial crises occur and whether contagion spreads crises.
In the existing literature, the simultaneity of financial crises across economies can be
explained by three different mechanisms, some of which are termed contagion and some of
which are not: First, crises can be simultaneous when emerging economies are affected by
a common shock, e.g., a shock to international interest rates, a shock to terms of trade,
etc. Second, crises can be simultaneous when there exist fundamental links across emerging
economies which facilitate the transmission of shocks from a ground zero country to other
emerging economies. Examples of these types of links include financial links between coun-
tries that share investors and trade links between economies that are commercial partners
or competitors. Third, crises might be simultaneous as a consequence of exogenous changes
in investors’ perceptions: when a crisis hits one country, the ground-zero country, investors
may expect a higher default probability in non ground-zero countries. As a consequence,
investors will reduce funds to non ground-zero countries and crisis spreads. While there is
debate in the literature about which of these three mechanisms should properly be called
contagion, the current paper defines contagion as the transmission of negative income shocks
that cannot be explained by a common shock to several economies1.
Identifying and explaining contagion has several important theoretical implications for
1Within the literature, some authors define contagion as the occurrence of simultaneous crises that
is explained only by exogenous changes in the investors’ perceptions. See, for example, Masson(1998),
Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens (2000), Forbes (2000, 2001), and Forbes and Rigobon (2000). Other authors
define contagion as the transmission of crises that can be explained either by fundamental links across
emerging economies or by exogenous changes in investors’ perceptions. See, for example, Corsetti et. al.
(1998), Presenti, and Tille(2000), De Gregorio and Valdes (2000), Diao et. al. (2000), Edwards (2000a,
2000b), Edwards and Susmel (2000, 2001), Kodres, and Pritsker, (2002), Kyle, and Xiong, (2001), Lagunoff,
and Schreft (2001), Paasche (2001), Pritsker (2000), Schinasi and Smith (1999), Valdes (1996), and Van
Rijckeghem and Weder (1999).
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Sovereign Bond Spreads: 1995-2000
Source: JP Morgan.
Figure 1: Sovereign Bond Spreads
the area of international finance. First, as discussed in Valdes (1996), contagion modifies
the credit constraints faced by emerging economies. In general, credit constraints originate
when problems of sovereign risk modify the formulation of emerging economies’ dynamic
optimal plans. When contagion is present, these constraints might vary through time for
reasons beyond domestic fundamentals of a particular economy. The economic analysis of
developing economies need to consider this possibility, and its impact on the formulation of
their optimal dynamic plans. Second, as Goldstein and Pauzner (2001) argue, the existence
of contagion modifies the extent to which diversification of risk is possible for investors.
In the presence of contagion, the globalization of capital markets bears a cost due to the
positive correlation between assets that would be otherwise independent. Contagion reduces
the means to diversify risk. This reduction introduces questions about the optimal degree
of openness of financial markets. Third, identifying the mechanisms that lead to contagion
allows for more precise policy evaluations faced by international organizations. For example,
if contagion is explained only by shifts in market sentiments, then information disclosure
standards might be justified. On the other hand, if contagion is explained by financial
links, then the imposition of some capital controls might be desirable. Additionally under
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the financial links explanation, country bailouts might be justified in order to reduce the
impact of the crisis over the international investors’ community and avoid crises of systemic
proportions. Finally, if contagion is explained by trade links, bailouts would not be the
best course of action. In this latter case, policies directed to enhancing trade diversification
would be more effective.
The simultaneity of crises has mainly affected emerging countries as in the cases of the
Latin American Debt crisis in 1982, the Mexican Crisis in 1994-1995, the East Asian Crises
in 1997, and the Russian crisis in 19982.
These financial crises have inspired a large economic literature addressing the issue of
contagion. However, despite the huge attention that the subject has received, the ori-
gin, severity, and extent of contagion of crises across economies has not been endogenously
explained by any model. Instead, most models analyze contagion in the framework of a
multiple equilibria world in which contagion results from an exogenous change in investors’
perceptions. The disadvantage of this approach is that in most cases this framework is
equally consistent with the occurrence of contagion and the non-occurrence of contagion. A
few models, on the other hand, have attempted a general equilibrium approach to under-
stand the role of links between countries in explaining contagion. But to generate contagion,
these models impose an exogenous correlation between emerging economies’ asset returns.
In contrast, in the present work, emerging economies’ returns are determined endogenously
within the model.
Among the few general equilibrium models that have considered the role of economic
links in contagion, to date, most models have focused on explaining contagion through trade
links. These models are silent about the role of financial links. However, empirically trade
links can only account for the severity and extension of contagion across economies that
have strong trade linkages with one another. In most recent cases of contagion, trade links
across infected countries were small or nonexistent. Even in the case where trade links were
economically relevant, the links alone were not strong enough to account for the severity of
contagion.
There are a few other shortcomings of the existing general equilibrium models: These
models abstract from uncertainty and financial market imperfections3. However, in the
2The Mexican crisis in 1994 hit the economies of Argentina and Brazil. The Russian crisis spread to
several countries in Latin America, and even developed countries were affected: The crisis spread to Brazil
in 1999 and hit the US as a correction in asset prices.
3Only Paasche (2001) has considered financial market imperfections. In Paasche, endogenous credit
constraints act as a propagation mechanism for contagion caused by trade links. His model, like all others
3
international finance literature, the inclusion of uncertainty and financial market imperfec-
tions has proved necessary to match the stylized facts of the emerging economies business
cycle. Also, the models that consider financial links focus on investors—why investors act
in a way that causes contagion, and how contagion affects those investors. However, these
models do not take into account the effects of contagion on emerging economies’ optimal
plans.
In contrast, the model developed in the current paper emphasizes financial market links
across countries in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium setting where the stochastic
processes of the emerging economies’ assets are endogenously determined. In addition,
the model in this paper undertakes a quantitative analysis of the impact of contagion on
emerging economies. The model studies how contagion can explain co-movements in the
price of emerging economy bonds, capital flows, output and consumption—beyond the level
explained by a country’s own fundamentals.
Within the present model, the framework is one of a set of small open economies with
stochastic endowments. These small open economies have access to an international credit
market populated by international investors. International investors are assumed to be risk
averse, with preferences that exhibit a decreasing absolute risk aversion in wealth (DARA).
Due to the fact that the number of countries is finite, international investors are not able
to completely diversify the risk of their investment in any country. There is a problem of
enforcement in the sense that international investors cannot force the small open economies
to repay their debts. These economies repay because it is in their interest to do so: If
any economy defaults it is temporarily excluded from the world asset market. Countries
weigh the benefits and costs of default, and decide to repay or not. This context forces
international investors to consider the risk of default when choosing their portfolio. Within
the model, any type of reallocation of the international investors portfolio has effects over
several countries at the same time. Therefore the risk of default is endogenously determined
by the economy’s own fundamentals and the fundamentals of other emerging economies:
other economies’ fundamentals determine the risk of default of those countries, which might
modify the portfolio choice of the international investors, and therefore the availability of
financial resources to any emerging economy.
Within this framework, income shocks to an emerging economy generate changes in
the risk of default in that economy. Through financial links, these changes in turn impact
other emerging economies. In this context, financial links generate contagion through two
of this type, is silent about the existence and importance of financial links across economies.
4
channels:
(i) The Wealth channel of contagion: If an income shock in the first country generate
losses for international investors, for example when the shock forces the first country
into default, then depending investors’ preferences, the negative wealth effect of the
shock may reduce investors’ tolerance for risk. A reduction in tolerance for risk would
make investors shift away from risky investments (countries) toward riskless (T-Bills).
Countries that did not default or face an income shock nonetheless face a reduction
in the amount of resources available to borrow from, and contagion occurs.
(ii) The Portfolio Recomposition channel of contagion: The risk of default might be
correlated across countries because income processes are correlated, or solely because
the possibility of contagion caused by financial links across countries (as the previously
explained wealth channel, or trade links between the economies). In the case where
default risk is positively correlated across countries, an increase in the risk of default
in the first country generates, for a given level of wealth of the investors, a increase
in the overall risk of their portfolio as investors expect other countries’ risk of default
to also increase. In this case, the change in the risk of default in one country modifies
the optimal portfolio of international investors. As investors adjust their portfolios,
countries which did not face an income shock nonetheless face a reduction in the
amount of resources available to borrow from, and contagion occurs.
The model in this paper extends the literature in endogenous sovereign risk in order
to consider sovereign bond markets in a multi-country framework.4 For the case of small
open economies, this type of model allows for an endogenous determination of the price
of one period non-contingent discount bonds as a function of the economy’s default risk.
Further, through the consideration of financial links across economies, the default risk of
any economy becomes a function not only of the domestic fundamentals but also a function
of investors characteristics and the fundamentals of countries which share investors with
the domestic country.
The main mechanism through which financial contagion occurs in the current paper, the
wealth channel, is analyzed in the papers of Goldstein and Pauzner (2001), Kyle and Xiong
(2001), and Lagunoff and Schreft (2001). These papers show that if investors’ preferences
4Recent papers in the literature of endogenous sovereign risk include Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), Arel-
lano (2008), Bai and Zhang (2006), Cuadra and Sapriza(2008), Lizarazo (2010),Hatchondo, Martinez and
Sapriza (2008), Martinez and Hatchondo (2009), Mendoza and Yue (2008), and Yue (2006).
5
exhibit DARA, the optimal response of the investors to financial losses is to reduce their
exposure to risky investments due to the reduction on their tolerance toward risk at lower
levels of wealth.
The secondary mechanism through which financial contagion occurs in the current pa-
per, the portfolio recomposition channel, is studied in the theoretical papers of Choueri
(1999), Schinasi and Smith (1999) and Kodres and Pritsker (2002). Using a static partial
equilibrium approach where the determination of asset returns is exogenous to the model,
these papers highlight the fact that contagion might be successfully explained by stan-
dard portfolio theory: in order to reestablish the optimal degree of risk exposure in their
portfolio after a negative shock to the return of the assets of some economy, it is optimal
for investors to liquidate their holdings of assets with expected returns that exhibit some
correlation with the expected return of the crisis country—whether this correlation is a
consequence of contagion or just correlated fundamentals.
Several papers have empirically studied the role of financial links in explaining conta-
gion. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998) find that the probability of crisis for any country is
the highest when another country that shares investors and/or lenders is in crisis. No other
shared characteristic with the crisis country (e.g. region, macroeconomic practices, trade
links, etc.) has as large an impact on the probability of crisis. Van Rijckeghem and Weder
(1999) present evidence that for the Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises spill-overs through
common bank lending were more significant in explaining contagion than trade linkages
and macroeconomic similarities. Kaminsky, Lyons and Scmukler (1999) find evidence that
individual share holders of open-end mutual funds followed contagion strategies in the case
of the Russian crisis, and to a lesser degree in the Mexican crisis: individual investors in mu-
tual funds (not mutual fund managers) sold securities from several emerging markets when
a crisis affected one of the countries. In the aftermath of the Mexican, Asian, and Russian
crises, Kaminsky Lyons and Schmukler (2000) find that when open-end mutual funds ad-
justed their portfolios they considered not only the degree of fragility in fundamentals of
the economies, but also factors emphasized by financial channels of contagion—openness
and liquidity of the markets, as well as the level of country risk of the economies. Kamin-
sky and Reinhart (2000) find that during the Russian-LCTM crises reductions in the risk
exposure of investors’ portfolios drastically reduced the liquidity of international capital
markets and increased their volatility. Hernandez and Valdes (2001) find the presence of
common lenders seems to explain almost all contagion episodes during the Asian, Russian,
and Brazilian crises. Common lenders are also highly significant in explaining contagion in
stock markets.
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The results of the current paper are consistent with the empirical evidence regarding
contagion as consequence of financial links.
First, since investors’ preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA),
they are able to tolerate more default risk when they are wealthier. So there is a positive
correlation between lenders’ wealth and their investment in emerging economies. Therefore
both capital flows to emerging economies and the equilibrium price of sovereign bonds are
increasing functions of investors’ wealth levels5. This result implies that the current model
can explain the high correlation of sovereign bond spreads and capital flows across emerg-
ing economies. Furthermore, the high correlation between investors’ wealth and emerging
economies financing conditions can account for the simultaneity of crises because a default
by any economy is equivalent to a negative wealth shock to the investors. This shock is
transmitted to other countries via the wealth channel of contagion.
Second, because the endogenous credit limits faced by the emerging economy are a func-
tion of investors’ wealth and risk aversion, then when the probability of default increases
for some foreign country, other countries’ financing conditions change. When the probabil-
ity of default for some foreign country increases, two opposing forces affect the financing
situation of other emerging economies: On the one hand, a decrease in the price of the
sovereign bonds of the foreign country constitutes an expected future negative wealth shock
to the investors due to the higher associated probability that this country will default. This
expected negative wealth shock increases the incentives of the other economies to default,
and their default risk. On the other hand, an increase in default probabilities induces a
substitution away from the assets of the economy whose risk increases strongly towards the
assets of the economies whose risk does not increase too much. This effect would tend to
increase the set of financial contracts available to some emerging economies. Given the op-
posing wealth and substituition effects, contagion occurs when the wealth effect dominates.
In this case, the correlation of capital flows across emerging economies is positive. If the
substitution effect dominates, “flight to quality” is observed: when several other countries
are affected by financial crises emerging economies with robust fundamentals receive capital
flows. The effect of the expected negative wealth shock will dominate the substitution effect
whenever investors’ wealth is sufficiently low, or their degree of risk aversion is sufficiently
high, or the economies fundamentals are sufficiently weak. In the numerical simulations in
5This result is consistent with empirical findings which demonstrate a positive relation between proxies of
investors wealth (like developed economies’ GDP or stock indexes) and capital flows to emerging economies.
It is also consistent with the empirical literature on the determination of sovereign credit spreads for emerging
economies. See for example Goldberg (2001), Hernandez, Mellado and Valdes (2001), FitzGerald, and Krolzig
(April 2003), Mody and Taylor (2004), Warther (1995), and Ferruci, Herzberg, Soussa, and Taylor (2004).
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the present paper, the wealth effects dominate and contagion occurs.
Third, the likelihood of default in equilibrium for any emerging economy is a function
not only of investors’ characteristics and the economy’s own fundamentals, but also of other
emerging economies’ fundamentals. In the numerical simulations in the present paper, de-
fault is more likely to be an equilibrium outcome when the fundamentals of other economies
deteriorate.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II documents some episodes of simultaneous
crises across economies and discusses some empirical results which motivate the study of
contagion; section III develops the model; section IV characterizes the equilibrium of the
model; section V presents the numerical results of the paper; and section VI concludes.
2 Evidence Of Contagion: Time Clustered Crisis
International capital markets are highly volatile. A striking feature of this volatility is that
most episodes of crisis within the last two decades have not been restricted to individual
countries, or even regions. This time-clustering of crises has led economists to borrow from
epidemiology the term contagion. Some examples of time clustered crises follow.
The Debt Crisis of 1982: Between 1979-1981 capital flows in the form of bank lending
to Latin American countries reached about 6% of the region’s GDP (their peak was $41
billion in 1981). In 1982, after a tremendous hike in international interest rates, Mexico
declared a moratorium on its debt, and emerging markets around the world were excluded
from voluntary capital markets and forced to run current account surpluses to pay their
foreign debts. The crisis affected all countries in Latin America and spread to countries as
far as Nigeria, the Philippines and Yugoslavia.
The Mexican Crisis in 1994: During the period 1992-1994, Mexico’s current account
deficit averaged more than 7% of the GDP. In 1995, after the crisis the country’s current
account was forced into balance, and the economy experienced a negative growth of 6.5%.
During the two quarters following Mexican devaluation, international mutual funds reduced
their average exposure to Brazil by approximately 5%. In Argentina, the central bank lost
about a third of its liquid international reserves, and the banking system lost 18% of its
deposits. Argentina’s real GDP fell by almost 5% during 1995.
The Asian crises of 1997: During the mid-1990s flows into Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea,
the Philippines and Thailand averaged more than US$40 billion per annum, with a maxi-
mum of US$70 billion in 1996. During the crisis period more than US$100 billion in short
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term debt bank loans were recalled from these same countries.
The Russian Default/Devaluation in August of 1998: By mid-August of 1998 a severe
crisis began in Russia due to fiscal imbalances, the deterioration of the capital account, the
fall in international prices of Russian exports, and huge losses of international reserves. This
crisis spread to Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Pakistan and South Africa. As noted
in Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler (2000), following the Russian crisis, total capital inflows
for Latin America diminished 35%, and short term portfolio flows—bonds, equity and bank
lending—fell by 60%. Dornbush, Park and Claessens (2000) argue that the sharp reversal in
capital flows to emerging economies after this crisis triggered recessions in many developing
countries, and that in 1999 two fifths of the world economy experienced recession, with
most GDP declines concentrated in the developing world.
As discussed in the introduction, the occurrence of simultaneous crises can be attributed
to one of three type of reasons: i) monsoonal effects which are due to a common shock to
several economies; ii) transmission of the crises through international fundamental economic
links; iii) changes in international investors’ perception about the outlook of an economy
after a negative shock in some other economy.
Once the phenomena of time-cluster crises is observed, empirical tests are necessary
to determined which of the previous reasons can explain the occurrence of simultaneous
crises. The empirical literature on this subject is quite large, and evidence of contagion
in sovereign bonds markets is considerable: according to Valdes (1996), during the period
1986-1994 there was increased co-movement between emerging economies’ sovereign bond
markets in periods of crisis; Baig and Goldfajn (1998) find that during the Asian crisis
there was an increase in cross-country correlation among sovereign bond markets of the
East Asian Economies affected by the crises; Edwards (1998) finds evidence of significant
propagation of volatility from Mexico to Argentina bond markets during the Mexican Crisis;
and Baig and Goldfajn (2000) find that during the Russian crisis there was contagion from
Russia to Brazil Brady market.
3 The Model
The model is a discrete time, infinite horizon model. There are two types of agents in
the model, J < ∞ representative agent small open economies, and infinite identical risk
averse international investors. In each period, each of the emerging economies receives a
stochastic endowment of tradable goods. The representative agents of these economies may
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smooth their consumption across periods by trading non-contingent discount bonds with
the international investors but the emerging economies are not able to trade financial assets
between them. For their part, investors may trade assets with the emerging countries or
with industrialized countries. Thus the investors must choose an optimal allocation of their
portfolio between the bonds of the emerging economies and bonds of the industrialized
countries, denominated hereafter as T-Bills. By having only a finite number of small open
economies, the possibilities of diversification for the investors are limited.
The market for T-bills, θTB, is not modeled explicitly. Debt contracts between the
investors and industrialized countries are assumed to be enforceable, and investors are
price takers in the market for T-Bills. The price of T-Bills, qf , which is not determined
endogenously in this context, is assumed to be deterministic. Therefore T-Bills are riskless
assets.
Bonds of emerging economies, bj , on the other hand, are risky assets because debt
contracts between the investors and the emerging economies are not enforceable. As a
consequence, there is a one sided commitment problem. While investors are able to commit
to honor their debt obligations with the emerging economies, the representative agents of
the emerging countries are not able to commit to honor their obligations with international
investors. Therefore, in each period, the representative agent of each emerging economy
compares the costs and benefits derived from the repayment of her obligations. The decision
between repayment or default is made individually by each agent of each emerging economy.
Each agent of any economy makes her decision, taking as given the decision of the other
agents in her economy. However given that all agents in a given economy are identical
and do not follow mixed strategies, it is possible to focus attention on the problem of the
representative agent of each economy.
If any economy defaults, international investors are able to collude to punish her. As
a consequence of default, it is assumed that investors will collude to temporarily exclude
the defaulting country from financial markets. After defaulting in any subsequent period
the country might re-enter international financial markets with an exogenously given prob-
ability θ. Since all investors behave in the same exact way, it is possible to focus on the
representative international investor.
Both, the representative investor, and the representative agents of the economies take
as given the price function of each emerging economy’s non-contingent discount bonds, qj .
As laid out here, the asset market is imperfect in three different ways. First, there is a
one-sided commitment problem which implies that debt contracts with emerging economies
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are not enforceable. Second, markets are incomplete because the only traded assets are one
period no-contingent bonds, and risk free T-Bills. Therefore the representative investor is
not able to insure away the income uncertainty specific to the emerging countries. Third,
the market structure of the financial market is non-competitive: investors form a cartel that
colludes to punish any deviant investor or borrower.
In this model the state of the world is complex object defined as follows:
Definition 1 The state of the world, S = (s,W,ψ), is given by the realization of the
emerging economies’ fundamentals, s = s1×s2× . . .×sJ , the representative investor’s asset
position or wealth, W , and a probability measure ψ on s ×W × Γ where Γ is a borel σ-
algebra. In this model sj = (bj , yj , dj) where bj is economy’s j asset position, yj is economy’s
j endowment, and dj is a variable that describes if the economy j is in default or repayment
state.
3.1 International Investors
There are an infinite number of identical price-taking investors. Investors collude in order
to punish any borrower that defaults on her debts or any investor that lends to a borrower
who has previously defaulted, so that a defaulting country is temporarily excluded from the
financial markets6.
The representative investor is a risk averse agent whose preferences over consumption
are defined by a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) periodic utility function with pa-
rameter γL > 0. The investor has perfect information regarding the income process of the
emerging economy, and in each period the investor is able to observe the realizations of this
endowment.
The representative investor maximizes her discounted expected lifetime utility from
consumption
Max
cLt
E t
∞∑
t=0
βtLv
(
cLt
)
(1)
where cL is the investor’s consumption. The period utility of this agent is given by v(cL) =
(cL)1−γ
L
1−γL . The representative investor is endowed with some initial wealth W0, at time 0,
and in each period, the investor receives an exogenous income X.
6The assumption of temporarily exclusion is supported by the data: Empirical evidence suggests that
once a country defaults, that country is excluded from the credit market for an average of 5.4 years (Gelos,
Sahay, and Sandleris 2003).
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Because the representative investor is able to commit to honor her debt, she can borrow
or lend from industrialized countries (which are not explicitly modeled here) by buying
T-Bills at the deterministic risk free world price of qf . The representative investor can also
invest in non-contingent bonds of the emerging economy. These bonds have an endogenously
determined stochastic price of qj . In each period the representative investor faces the budget
constraint
W +X = cL +
J∑
j=1
djqjθ
′
j + q
fθTB′ (2)
where W is the investor’s wealth at time t, θ′j is the portfolio allocation to the emerging
country and θTB′ is the investor’s allocation to the riskless asset. dj is a variable that de-
termines the default/repayment state of the emerging economy j in the current period:dj is
an indicator function that represents the emerging economy’s j repayment/default decision
in the current period. dj takes the value of 1 when the small open economy j chooses to
repay its debts, and takes a value of 0 otherwise.
It is assumed that investors cannot go short in their investments with emerging
economies. Therefore whenever the emerging economy is saving, the representative in-
ternational investor receives these savings and invests them completely in riskless bonds
(T-Bills). The representative investor does not use these resources to go long in T-Bills.
This assumption implies that θ′j ≥ 0 for all t and j7.
The law of motion of the representative investor’s wealth is given by
W ′ =
J∑
j=1
d′jθ
′
j + θ
TB′. (3)
The optimization problem that the representative investor faces can be described as
one in which in each period t the representative international investor optimally chooses
her portfolio according to her preferences in order to maximize her discounted expected
lifetime utility from consumption, subject to her budget constraint, the law of motion of
her wealth, and given W0. This dynamic problem can be represented recursively by the
7This assumption does not seem to be inconsistent with reality. For example, while mutual funds are
strictly restricted by The Investment Company Act in their ability to leverage or borrow against the value
of securities in their portfolio, hedge funds and other types of investments face no such restrictions. Since
international investments like hedge funds are not subject to these type of regulations, it seems reasonable
to have the simplifying assumption that international investors are able to leverage the riskless asset, θTB ,
but must have a non-negative position on the emerging economy’s asset.
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Bellman Equation
V L (S) = max
{θ′j}Jj=1, θTB′
v
(
cL
)
+EβV L
(
S′
)
(4)
s.t. W +X = cL +
J∑
j=1
djqjθ
′
j + q
fθTB′
W ′ =
J∑
j=1
d′jθ
′
j + θ
TB′
θ′j ≥ 0 j = 1, . . . , J
cL > 0
W ′ ≥ W (5)
Equation (5) corresponds to the “natural” debt limit discussed in Aiyagari (1994), which
prevents the representative investor from running ponzi games.
Since the representative investor is not credit constrained (Equation (5)), the solution
to the stochastic dynamic problem for the representative investor can be characterized by
the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
For θTB′
qfvcL
(
cL
)
= βLE
[
vcL
(
cL
′)]
+
(
βLE
[
$′
]− qf$) . (6)
For θ′j
qj
(
vcL
(
cL
)
+$
)
dj = βLE
[(
vcL
(
cL
′)
+$′
)
d′j
]
dj . (7)
where $ corresponds to the multiplier on the non-negativity constraint for the investors
consumption cL.
For X sufficiently large, the non-negativity constraints for the representative investor’s
consumption are not binding at any time (therefore $ = $′ = 0). Therefore the investor’s
optimization problem has an interior solution for the portfolio allocation.
When the non-negativity constraints are not binding the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
the investor’s problem correspond to the following first order conditions:8
8Lizarazo (2010) discusses the issue of binding non-negativity constraints for the case of one emerging
economy and risk averse investors. The results in this paper extend to the framework here: i)When these
non-negativity constraints are binding in the current period, the current period portfolio allocation to the
emerging economies implies lower levels of investment than the “optimal” ones; other things equal, the
lower investment implies higher incentives to default by the emerging economies. ii) When these non-
negativity constraints are binding only in future periods, the current period portfolio allocation to the
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• For θTB′
qfvcL
(
cL
)
= βLE
[
vcL
(
cL
′)]
. (8)
• For θ′j
qjvcL
(
cL
)
dj = βLE
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
dj
′
]
dj (9)
According to (8), the investor chooses an allocation to the riskless asset such that the
discounted expected marginal benefit of future consumption equals the marginal cost of
current consumption. The set of J equations (9) determines the allocation of the resources
of the representative investor to each one of the J emerging countries. Unless emerging
country j is not in a default state, i.e. dj = 1, emerging country j does not belong in the
investment set of the international investors. If country j has not defaulted, then the jth
equation(9) also equates the marginal cost of allocating wealth to bonds issued by emerging
country j to the discounted expected marginal benefit of this investment. The benefit of
this investment is realized only in those periods in which the emerging economy j optimally
chooses to repay its debts
(
dj
′ = 1
)
.
It is possible to manipulate equation (9) to get
qj =
βLE
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′j
]
vcL (cL)
= βL
Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′j
]
+ EvcL
(
cL
′
)
Ed′j
vcL (cL)
=
βLCov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′j
]
vcL (cL)
+ qf (1− δj)
=
βLCov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′j
]
vcL (cL)
+ qRNj .
= ζj + qRNj . (10)
where Ed′j= 1− δj , and δj is the probability that the emerging economy will default in the
next period and qRNj corresponds to the price of the emerging economy j’s bonds that would
equate the expected earnings of investing in the economy j’s risky bonds to the earnings
emerging economies implies higher levels of investment than the “optimal” ones; other things equal, the
higher investment implies lower incentives to default by the emerging economies.
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obtained by investing in riskless bonds. Given emerging economy’s default decisions for
next period d′, this price would prevail in a world with a risk neutral investor.
qRNj = q
f (1− δj)
ζj corresponds to an “excess” risk premium that sovereign bonds have to carry in order
to induce risk averse investors to hold them. This term is the principal source of the
transmission of crisis among countries that share investors. As shown in Lizarazo (2010),
the main determinant of the “excess” risk premium ζj is the covariance term in equation
(10). This covariance term is non-positive: Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
d′j
]
≤ 0.9
From the set of equations (10), it can be seen that bond prices of any emerging econ-
omy are a function not only of the economy’s own fundamentals but also of investors’ risk
aversion and wealth level (see Lizarazo (2010)). Additionally, and more importantly for
the purpose of this model, bond prices of any emerging economy are also a function of the
fundamentals of other emerging economies in the investor’s portfolio: Because consump-
tion of the representative investor is a function of her wealth, her risk aversion, and her
investments in other economies, sovereign bond prices of the emerging economy j are also
a function of those variables10.
9When the emerging economy does not find it optimal to default next period in any state of the world,
then dj
′ = 1 for all states. Therefore Cov
[
vcL

cL
′
dj
′
]
= 0. On the other hand, when next period there
exist states of the world in which the emerging economy would optimally choose to default, then for the
states in which it is not optimal to default, dj
′ = 1. In this case, next period wealth of the representative
investor is given by
W ′ |  dj ′ = 1 = θj ′ + θjTB′
and next period wealth of the representative investor is given by
W ′ |  dj ′ = 0 = θTB′
It is obvious that
W ′ |  dj ′ = 1 > W ′ |  dj ′ = 0
Therefore it must hold that [
cL
′ |  dj ′ = 1 ] ≥ [cL′ |  dj ′ = 0 ]
implying [
vcL c
L′ |  dj ′ = 1 ] ≤ [vcL cL′ |  dj ′ = 0 ]
As a consequence, for higher dj
′ , we have lower vcL c
L′ . Clearly for this case Cov
[
vcL c
L′ dj ′
]
< 0.
10The way in which sovereign bond prices depend on investors’ wealth and risk aversion is discussed in
depth in Lizarazo (2010). Whenever investors are wealthier, the marginal cost for them in terms of utility of
an additional unit of investment on sovereign bonds is relatively low. Taking as given the price of the bonds
of an emerging economy j , it must hold that the net flow of resources to the economy
 
i.e., − qjb′j is
increasing in investors’ wealth and decreasing in investor’s risk aversion. It will be evident once the emerging
economies’ problem is described that the benefits for the economy from paying her debts are also increasing
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Because both investors’ wealth and fundamentals of other emerging economies in the
investors’ portfolio have an effect on the determination of bond prices of some economy
j, it is clear that sovereign bond prices across economies that share investors are jointly
determined and therefore must be correlated.
The discussion on the way in which other countries fundamentals affect the determina-
tion of economy j′s bond prices, and debt flows will be postponed until the section on the
characterization of contagion channels.
3.2 Sovereign Countries
The representative agent of each emerging economy j maximizes her discounted expected
lifetime utility from consumption
max
{cj,t}∞t=0
Eτ
∞∑
t=0
βtu (cj, t) (11)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and cj, t is the j emerging economy’s consumption
at time t. The emerging economy’s periodic utility takes the functional form
u(cj) =
c1−γj
1− γ
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In each period, each economy j receives a stochastic stream of consumption goods
yj . This endowment is non-storable, and it is independently distributed across emerging
economies; realizations of the endowment are assumed to have a compact support; and
the endowment follows a Markov process drawn from probability space (yj , Yj (yj)) with a
transition function f(y′j | yj).
In each period, based on the stochastic endowment yj , the economy decides how much
to consume cj . The economy can consume cj > yj by trading one period non-contingent
discount bonds bj ′ at a price qj with international investors. The economy may only trade
bonds in period t if the economy is not in default state.
At any point in time, the emerging economies differ in their endowment and their asset
position. Therefore it is necessary to have a probability measure ψ on s ×W × Γ where
in investors’ wealth (decreasing in investor’s risk aversion). Therefore incentives to default decrease with
investors’ wealth (increase with investor’s risk aversion). In equilibrium sovereign economies bond prices are
increasing in investors’ wealth (decreasing in investor’s risk aversion).
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Γ is a borel σ-algebra. This probability measure is known by all the agents and its law of
motion of the distribution is given by:
ψ′ = H(ψ) (12)
In equilibrium, the price of bonds of any emerging economy j is determined by both the
investors and the emerging economies. As in other models of endogenous sovereign risk,
as a consequence of the commitment problems on the side of the emerging economies, the
price of the emerging economy’s bond varies with the level of borrowing of those economies.
If b′j ≥ 0, there is no risk of default on such a bond. In this case, the emerging economy’s
bond is identical to the bonds issued by industrialized markets; therefore, because the
representative investor is a price taker, in equilibrium the bond price of a emerging economy
with no default risk is the same as the bond price of industrialized countries. Consequently,
the price of a bond with a positive face value is equal to the price of a T-Bill, so qj = qf .
If bj ′ < 0 the emerging country j is borrowing. In this case, because emerging economies
cannot bind themselves to honor their debts, the emerging country j might default next
period. There might be values of bj ′ < 0, for some given state of the world, S, such that
the representative agent of the economy never finds it optimal to default. In this case
the bonds issued by the emerging economy do not involve any default risk, and therefore
qj = qf . However, for the same state of the world, S, some other values of bj ′ < 0 might
imply that the emerging economy will find it optimal to default on her debts in some states
of the world next period S′. In this case, in order to induce international investors to buy
the emerging economy’s bonds, the price of such bonds needs to be lower than the price
of a T-Bill, qj < qf . Finally, for the same state of the world, S, there might be values of
bj
′ < 0 such that once the debt is due the economy would not choose to repay in any state
of the world next period, S′. In this case qj = 0.
Therefore, the price of any emerging economy’s bonds is a function not only of the state
of the world, S, but also of bj ′.
The resource constraint of the emerging economy j is given by
cj = yj − (1− dj)φ+ dj
(
bj − qjb′j
)
, (13)
where dj , which was defined in the investor’s section, describes the state of economy with
respect to participation in international financial markets. If dj = 1, the economy is not
in a default state. If dj = 0, the emerging economy is in a state of default (either because
she has defaulted on her debts in a previous period and has not regained access to financial
markets or because she is defaulting on her debts in the current period); in this case, this
17
country is in a state of temporary financial autarky. Once a country defaults, that country
is temporarily excluded from access to the credit market, and the country remains in a state
of default for a random number of periods. During the periods of exclusion from financial
markets, the country is not able to smooth its consumption, and it is limited to consume its
stochastic endowment minus some amount given by a function φ that defines the direct loss
in terms of endowment that the country faces during the periods of exclusion from credit
markets.
Under this framework, the optimization problem of the emerging country j can be
represented recursively by the following Bellman equation
Vj(S) = max
{
V Cj (S), V
D
j (S)
}
(14)
and
V Cj (S) = max
cj , bj
′ u (cj) + βEVj
(
S′ | S)
s.t. cj = yj + bj − qjb′j
(15)
where V Cj (S) is the value for economy j of not defaulting and V
D
j (S) is the value of de-
faulting in the current period.
Definition 2 The value for the emerging economy j of default is given by
V Dj (S) = u(yj − φ) + βE[θV Cj (S′ | S) + (1− θ)V Dj (S′ | S)].
where θ is the exogenous probability of re-entry to the credit markets after defaulting, and
φ is a function that defines the direct punishment to a defaulting country.
For the emerging country, the decision of default/repayment depends on the comparison
between the continuation value of the credit contract, V Cj (S) , versus the value of opting for
financial autarky V Dj (S). The decision of current default/repayment takes the functional
form:
d j =
{
1 if V Cj (S) > V
D
j (S)
0 otherwise
}
(16)
Definition 3 For a given level of wealth, W , and the fundamentals of other emerging
economies in the investor’s portfolio, the default set Dj
(
b | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ
)
consists of
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the equilibrium set of yj for which default is optimal when emerging economy’s j′s asset
holdings are bj:
Dj(bj | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) =
{
yj ∈ Y j : V Cj (S) ≤ V Dj (S)
}
. (17)
Equilibrium default sets, Dj(b′j | {s′k(S)}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W ′(S), ψ′(ψ)), are related to equilib-
rium default probabilities, δj(S′ | S), by the equation
δj(S′ | S) = Edj ′(S′ | S) =
∫
Dj(b
′
j |{s′k(S)}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W ′(S),ψ′(ψ))
f(y′j | yj)dy′j . (18)
If the default set is empty for bj ′, then for all realizations of the economy j′s endowment
dj
′ = 1 and the equilibrium default probability δj(S′ | S) is equal to 0. In this case, it is not
optimal for the economy to default in the next period for any realization of its endowment,
Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
dj
′
]
= 0 and qj = qf . On the other hand, if the default set includes the entire
support for the endowment realizations, i.e. Dj(b′j | {s′k(S)}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W ′(S), ψ′(ψ)) = Yj ,
then dj ′ = 0 for all realizations of the economy’s endowment. As a consequence, the
equilibrium default probability δj(S′ | S) is equal to 1, and Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
dj
′
]
= 0, so
qj = 0.
Otherwise, when the default set is not empty but does not include the whole support
for the endowment realizations 0 < δj(S′ | S) < 1. In this case Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
dj
′
]
> 0, so
qj < q
f .
Equations (10),(14),(16),(17) and (18) make clear that for the case of an economy that
cannot commit to repayment, when there exist levels of b′ in which the emerging economy
finds it optimal to default in some states of the world, then the price of bonds depends
not only on the emerging economy’s fundamentals, the representative investor’s level of
wealth and risk aversion, but on the fundamentals of other emerging economies. This
dependence of bond prices on the fundamentals of other emerging economies cannot be
reproduced endogenously by models with risk neutral investors: in models of endogenous
sovereign with risk neutral investors, the price of bonds of the economy depends only on
the economy’s own fundamentals.
4 Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium for this model is defined as a set of policy functions for (i) the
emerging economies’ consumption {cj(S)}Jj=1,(ii) the emerging economy’s asset holdings
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{
b′j(S)
}J
j=1
, (iii)the emerging economy’s default decisions {dj(S)}Jj=1 and the associated
default sets {Dj (bj |W )}Jj=1, (iv) the representative investor’s consumption cL(S), (v) the
representative investor’s holdings of emerging economies’ bonds
{
θ′j(S)
}J
j=1
, (vi) the rep-
resentative investor’s holdings of T-Bills θTB ′(S), (vii) the emerging economies’ bond price
functions {q(S, b′)}Jj=1, (viii) the law of motion of the distribution H(ψ),(ix) an aggregate
law of motion of the world economy Q(S,Γ; {b′j}Jj=1,W ′), and (x) an updating operator
T (ψ,Q(SΓ; {b′j}Jj=1,W ′)) such that:
(i) Taking as given the representative investor’s policies, the bond price functions
{qj(S, b′)}Jj=1, the law of motion of the distributionH(ψ),and the aggregate law of mo-
tion of the world economy Q(S,Γ; {b′j}Jj=1,W ′), the emerging economies’ consumption
{cj(S)}Jj=1 satisfies the economies’ resource constraints. Additionally, the economies’
policy functions
{
b′j(S)
}J
j=1
, {dj(S)}Jj=1 and default sets {Dj (b|W )}Jj=1 satisfy the
optimization problem of the emerging economies.
(ii) Taking as given the emerging economy’s policies, the bond price functions
{qj(S, b′)}Jj=1, the law of motion of the distribution H(ψ),and the aggregate law of
motion of the world economy Q(S,Γ; {b′j}Jj=1,W ′), the representative investor’s con-
sumption cL(s) satisfies the investor’s budget constraint. Also, the representative
investor’s policy functions
{
θ′j(S)
}J
j=1
and θTB ′(S) satisfy the optimization problem
of the representative investor and the law of motion of the investor’s wealth.
(iii) Bond prices reflect the emerging economies’ probability of default and the risk pre-
mium demanded by the representative international investor; and these prices clear
the market for all the emerging economies’ bonds:
bj
′(S) = −θj ′(S) if bj ′(S) < 0 (19a)
0 = −θj ′(S) if bj ′(s) ≥ 0. (19b)
Equations (19a) and (19b) imply that in equilibrium each emerging economy j and
the representative investor agree on a financial contract, bj ′ and qj , that is optimal
for both agents.
(iv) The law of motion of the distribution H(ψ), the aggregate law of motion of the world
economy Q(S,Γ; {b′j}Jj=1,W ′), and the updating operator T (ψ,Q(SΓ; {b′j}Jj=1,W ′))
are such that
H(ψ) = T (ψ,Q(S,Γ; {bj ′}Jj=1,W ′)). (20)
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4.1 Characterization of Default Sets
The characterization of default sets is the characterization of incentives to default and
therefore the characterization of endogenous default risk. In the model, default risk is
a function of the emerging economy’s fundamentals (the economy’s endowment process
and its asset position), the characteristics of the international investor (the investor’s risk
aversion and wealth), and the fundamentals of other countries, k 6= j, that share investors
with country j. This section focus on the role that investors’ characteristics and the own
j emerging economy’s fundamentals have on the determination of default incentives for
economy j. The role of other economies’ fundamentals in the characterization of default
sets is analyzed in the section on contagion.
Maximum Credit Constraint and Maximum Safe Level of Debt In order to
continue with the characterization of the default sets, it is necessary to define two con-
cepts, the maximum credit constraint and the maximum safe level of debt. The maxi-
mum credit constraint is the maximum level of assets, bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ), that is low
enough such that no matter what the realization of the endowment, default is the optimal
choice and Dj(bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) = Yj . In contrast, the maximum
safe level of debt is the minimum level of assets bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) for which staying
in the contract is the optimal choice for all realizations of the endowment. In this case,
Dj(bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) = ∅. Finally, because the value of the credit
contract is monotonically decreasing in bj ,
bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) ≤bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) ≤ 0
Proposition 1 For any state of the world, S, the maximum credit constraint
bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ), and the maximum safe level of debt bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) are singled-
valued functions.
Proof. To define these concepts note that the stochastic process for the endowments
have a compact support. Also note that, conditional on W , the fundamentals of other
emerging economies in the investors’ portfolio, and the distribution ψ, the value of the
credit contract is monotonically decreasing in bj . Monotonicity of the credit contract and
compactness of the endowment support are sufficient conditions to guarantee that given the
state of the world these critical values (i.e, endogenous credit constraint and maximum safe
level of debt) are single-valued functions.
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From the previous discussion, it is clear that given some current level of investors’ wealth,
the fundamentals of other emerging economies in the investors’ portfolio, and the distribu-
tion ψ, any investments in the emerging economy’s bonds in excess of bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ)
imply a probability of default equal to 1. These investments will have a price of 0. On
the other hand, all investments in the emerging economy’s bond of an amount lower than
bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) imply a zero probability of default. These investments will have a
price of qf .
Default Sets and Risk Aversion of International Investors As discussed in
Lizarazo (2010), the degree of investors’ risk aversion is an important determinant of emerg-
ing economies’ access to credit markets and of the risk of default. Lizarazo (2010) shows
that the more risk averse are international investors, the higher is the default risk and the
tighter is the endogenous credit constraint faced by all emerging economies.
Proposition 2 For any state of the world, S, as the risk aversion of the international
investor increases, the emerging economies’ incentives to default increase.
Proof. See Appendix.
The result in Proposition 2 is an extension of Lizarazo (2010) to the case of several
economies that share international risk averse investors. (Lizarazo (2010) presents the case
of one emerging economy that faces international risk averse investors.) Proposition 2 is
consistent with empirical findings which characterize the role of investor’s risk aversion in
the determination of country risk and sovereign yield11.
Default Sets and Investor’s Wealth In the present model, the investor’s wealth
also affects the emerging economy’s performance. This result is formalized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Default sets are shrinking in the assets of the representative investor. For
all W1 < W2, if default is optimal for bj in some states yj, given W2 then default will be
optimal for bj for the same states yj, given W1. Therefore Dj
(
bj |W2, ψ, {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j
)
⊆
Dj
(
bj |W1, ψ, {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j
)
11See, for example, Ferruci et. al. (2004), Mody and Taylor (2004), FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003), Cun-
ningham, Dixon and Hayes (2001), Westphalen (2001), and Kamin and von Kleist (1999) and Arora and
Cerisola (2001).
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Proof. See Appendix.
The result in Proposition 3 is also an extension to the present context of a similar result
in Lizarazo (2010). Proposition 3 is consistent with the findings of several empirical papers
on the literature regarding the determinants of capital flows and sovereign bonds spreads
of emerging economies12.
Default Sets and the Asset Position of the Emerging Economy In the model,
a highly indebted economy is more likely to default than an economy with lower debt. And
as in models of the same type where lenders are risk neutral, default sets are shrinking in
assets.
Proposition 4 Default sets are shrinking in assets of the emerging economy. For all bj,1 <
bj,2, if default is optimal for bj,2 in some states yj , given W , and the asset position of other
emerging economies in the investors’ portfolio, then default will be optimal for bj,1 for the
same states yj, given W,and the asset position of other emerging economies in the investors’
portfolio. Therefore Dj
(
bj,2 | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ
)
⊆ Dj
(
bj,1 | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ
)
.
This result is analogous to the results in the previous literature on endogenous sovereign
risk. 13 The main difference in the present paper is that the result is conditioned on the level
of wealth of the representative investor, and the fundamentals of other emerging economies
in the investors’ portfolio. The result is consistent with the empirical literature on the
determination of credit ratings and yield-bond spreads.14
Default Sets and Endowment Realization Default sets also depend on the re-
alization of income. As in Arellano (2008), it is possible to show analytically that if the
endowment process is i.i.d. for given W and the fundamentals of the other economies in the
investors’ portfolio, then default incentives are stronger for lower levels of income. The nu-
merical solution of the present model extends this result to the case in which the stochastic
process of the endowments follows a Markov chain with persistence.
12See, for example, Warther (1995), Westphalen (2001), Kang et al (2003), FitzGerald and Krolzig (2003),
Mody and Taylor (2004), and Ferruci et al (2004). Proposition 3 is also consistent with the evidence regarding
financial contagion across countries who share investors. See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1998),
Van Rijckeghem and Weder (1999), Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) and Hernandez, and Valdes (2001).
13For similar results see for example Arellano (2008), and Aguiar and Gopinath(2006), and Lizarazo
(2010).
14See for example, Cantor and Pecker (1996) and Cunningham, Dixon and Hayes (2001).
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Proposition 5 If the endowment process is i.i.d., default incentives are stronger the
lower the endowment. For all yj,1 < yj,2 if yj,2 ∈ Dj
(
bj | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ
)
then
yj,1 ∈ Dj
(
bj | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ
)
.
The intuition for this result follows Arellano (2008). The main difference is that in the
present context, the result is conditioned on the level of wealth of the investors and the
fundamentals of other emerging economies in the investor’s portfolio.
The logic behind this result follows from the fact that default is only optimal if under all
feasible financial contracts the emerging economy experiences capital outflows. In the case
of a recession, capital outflows are extremely costly in terms of the welfare of a risk averse
agent (because the concavity of the periodic utility). Therefore at sufficiently low levels of
the endowment realization, the credit market becomes a less effective tool for consumption
smoothing than default.
This result is also consistent with the empirical literature on the determination of credit
ratings and sovereign yields. In this literature, sovereign yield spreads increase when the
economy’s fundamentals deteriorate, mainly when GDP falls.
Additionally, this result implies that because default risk is counter-cyclical, domestic
interest rates are also counter-cyclical. Counter cyclicality is consistent with the stylized
facts of financial emerging markets (see Neumeyer and Perri (2004), and Uribe and Yue
(2003)).
5 Contagion
This section characterizes the role of the fundamentals of foreign emerging economies in the
determination of the incentives to default for the domestic emerging economy.
The domestic emerging economy’s default sets also depend on the default/repayment
decisions of other emerging economies in the investors’ portfolios. A crisis in some foreign
emerging economy k can be seen as a shock that changes the default/repayment decisions
of that country, and therefore the bond prices of that country; therefore a crisis in emerging
economy k has a wealth and a substitution effect over the optimal investor’s portfolio
allocation to other emerging economies.
First, the crisis in country k has a negative current or expected wealth effect in the
investors. Because the investor’s preference exhibit DARA, she would move away from
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risky emerging economies’ assets towards safer assets; this effect corresponds to the channel
previously referred to as the wealth channel of contagion.
Second, the crisis in country k generates substitution between different risky emerging
economy assets in the investor’s portfolio. The substitution effect of the crisis corresponds
to the channel previously referred to as the portfolio recomposition channel of contagion.
More specifically, for the investor, whenever a crisis induces a default by country k a
negative wealth shock occurs. In this case the wealth channel of contagion would propagate
this negative shock to other risky emerging countries in the investor’s portfolio. Furthermore
the portfolio recomposition channel would amplify the negative effect of the wealth channel
of contagion. In this situation contagion of the crisis in country k to other risky emerging
economies in the investor’s portfolio is observed.15
On the other hand, when the crisis in country k implies an increase in the probability
of default of that country, the probability of a negative wealth shock to the investors in the
future increases. The expected wealth effect would propagate the negative shock in country
k to other risky countries in the investor’s portfolio through the wealth channel. However,
from the perspective of the international investor, assets of different emerging economies are
substitutes, therefore the substitution effect of the shock to country k would have different
effects in countries with weak fundamentals than in countries with solid fundamentals. For
countries with sufficiently weak fundamentals the recomposition channel of contagion would
amplify the effect of the wealth channel of contagion; for countries with sufficiently strong
fundamentals the recomposition channel of contagion would mitigate or even reverse the
effect of the wealth channel of contagion16.
15As discussed previously, the effect of other economies’ fundamentals in the domestic emerging economy
bond price has its origin in the response of the excess risk premium to changes in foreign fundamentals. The
response of the excess risk premium to those changes is dictated by the response to those same changes of
the covariance term in the equation of the bond prices. The covariance term can be written as:
Cov[vcL(c
L′)dj
′] =
∑
S′
pi(S′|S)vcL(cL
′
)dj
′ −
∑
S′
pi(S′|S)vcL(cL
′
)(1− δj(S′))
=
∑
S′
pi(S′|S)vcL(cL
′
)(dj
′(S′)− 1 + δj ′(S′)).
When in some state of the world, S, there are changes in the investor’s future consumption, cL, those
changes would have effects on some economy j′s covariance term as long as (dj ′(s′)− 1+ δj ′(s′)) is not 0 for
all S′, which in turns implies that δj is not either 0 or 1. Therefore only economies having the probability of
default between 0 and 1 are affected by changes in the investor’s future wealth and consumption. Countries
with probability of default 1 or 0 are not risky by definition, so only risky countries would be affected by
changes in other countries fundamentals.
16The definition of weak and strong fundamentals in this context is somewhat vague, and in a very
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For countries with weak fundamentals, after observing an increase in the probability of
default of country k, contagion is observed. However, for countries with strong fundamen-
tals, after the crisis in country k, the recomposition channel of contagion may reverse the
effect of the wealth channel of contagion. In this case, ”flight to quality” occurs. ”Flight to
quality” corresponds to the phenomena when countries with relatively strong fundamentals
receive capital inflows following a crises in some foreign emerging economy k.
For crises that do not imply an actual default by country k, but only an increase in the
probability of default in that country, the result over a particular economy (contagion or
flight to quality) would depend on the strength of the positive correlation between assets
returns of economies that share investors that is generated by the wealth channel of con-
tagion. For economies with sound fundamentals, if this positive correlation is not strong
enough—i.e., investor’s wealth is pretty high, or the investors are not too risk averse—the
positive substitution effect of the crisis in country k might dominate its negative wealth
effect. On the other hand, for economies with weak fundamentals, if either the wealth of
the investors’ is low, the expected wealth shock is large (i.e., the exposure of the investor to
the country with problems is large), or the investor’s risk aversion is high, then the portfolio
recomposition channel will amplify the effects of the wealth channel due to the increase in
the risk of some country k.
Wealth Channel of Contagion
Proposition 6 There is a wealth channel of contagion. Proposition 3 implies that if
economy k which is in the investor’s portfolio defaults in her debts, incentives to default for
economy j which is also in the investor’s portfolio increase.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition of Proposition 6 is straight forward: a default by some emerging econ-
omy in the investors’ portfolio is equivalent to a negative wealth shock. Therefore, from
Proposition 3 incentives to default for other economies in the investors’ portfolio increase
as a consequence of the default by economy k. The result in proposition 6 is the foundation
for the endogenous explanation of contagion of financial crises based on endogenous links
across economies that share investors. This result corresponds to the Wealth Channel of
contagion.
simplifying way corresponds to countries with relatively high default probability (and low bond prices) and
countries with relatively low default probability (and high bond prices), respectively.
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This result also implies that there is an expected negative wealth effect whenever the
probability of default increases for some emerging country in the investors’ portfolio. This
expected wealth effect would tend to reduce the long-term benefits of maintaining access to
international credit markets, and therefore would tend to increase the incentives to default
for the other countries in the investors’ portfolio.
The Recomposition Channel of Contagion
Proposition 7 There is a recomposition channel of contagion. Whenever the probability
of default of some country k increases, there is a recomposition of the investor’s portfolio:
the assets of emerging economies with weak fundamentals are substituted away by the assets
of emerging economies with solid fundamentals or by T-Bills.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition of Proposition 7 is as follows: whenever the probability of default of some
country k increases, the wealth channel of contagion implies that the shock reduces the
prices of the bonds of all economies in the investor’s portfolio; however, concavity of the
periodic utility function of the emerging economies implies that the increase in the incentives
to default of the economies with weak fundamentals would be larger than the increase in
the incentives to default of the economies with strong fundamentals. As a consequence,
the reduction in the bond prices of the economies with weak fundamentals is larger than
the reduction in the prices of the bonds of economies with strong fundamentals. Therefore
economy k and the economies with weak fundamentals become relatively more risky than
economies with strong fundamentals; and the substitution effect of the shock in k would
induce a substitution in the investors’ portfolio from assets of country k and economies with
weak fundamentals towards assets of emerging economies with strong fundamentals and to
riskless T-Bills.
Corollary 4 If following a crisis in some foreign emerging economy k the overall risk of
the investor’s portfolio increases, then the incentives to default for all emerging economies
increase.
Proof. See Appendix.
If at the time of the crisis in country k all emerging economies have relatively weak fun-
damentals, the recomposition channel of contagion would amplify the contagion generated
by the wealth channel of contagion. The intuition for this result comes from the fact that
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risk averse agents require an increasing risk premium in order to accept a higher level of
risk. Therefore whenever their portfolio as a whole becomes more risky investors would ask
for a larger risk premium from all the economies in order to allocate the same amount of
resources to those countries as before. As a consequence, an increase in risk would reduce
the benefits for all the economies to maintain participation in the credit markets, and would
therefore increase incentives to default. In turn the overall risk of the investor’s portfolio
will increase even further.
Corollary 5 For economies with strong fundamentals if the positive substitution effect of
the crisis in some foreign economy k dominates the negative expected wealth effect of the
crisis “flight to quality” occurs.
Proof. See Appendix.
On the other hand, if at the time of the crisis in country k the domestic emerging
economy has strong fundamentals,the recomposition channel of contagion would moderate
or even reverse the effect generated by the wealth channel of contagion. This effect is
consistent with the evidence of “flight to quality” observed during some periods of crises.
17
From the previous discussion, it is clear that the fundamentals of the domestic emerging
economy matter to determine if the wealth channel of contagion and the recomposition
channel of contagion go in the same direction or in opposite directions, and therefore if
the domestic economy experiences contagion or flight to quality. The numerical results
of this paper suggest that when considering productivity shocks which are independently
distributed across economies, a deterioration of the fundamentals of one economy causes an
endogenous worsening of the situation of the other emerging economy.
The analysis in this section allows us to connect the possibility of observing contagion
to the fragility of the fundamentals of an economy. In other words, given the investors’
characteristics we should expect a higher probability of contagion for those economies with
weaker fundamentals while economies with relatively strong fundamentals should experience
“flight to quality.”
17According to Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmulker (2001) during the two first quarters after the Mexican
crisis mutual fund flows to countries like Malaysia, Colombia, Poland and Czech Republic increased by more
than 10%. During the two first quarters after the Thai crisis, mutual funds flows to countries like Venezuela,
Slovak Republic and Sri Lanka increased by more than 5%. Finally, during the two first quarters after the
Russian crisis, mutual funds flows to Mexico and Singapore increased by more than 5%.
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5.1 Contagion at Equilibrium
In the current model, to observe contagion at equilibrium it is necessary to observe default
at equilibrium, since only the possibility of default generates the wealth and portfolio re-
composition channels of contagion. Therefore, to have contagion at equilibrium it must
hold that beginning from an asset position bj such that Dj
(
bj | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ
)
= ∅,
there exists a sequence of endowment shocks such that this economy ends up borrowing b′j
and Dj
(
bj | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ
)
6= ∅.
In order to establish if contagion and default might be equilibrium outcomes of the
model is necessary to determine if there exists such a b′j < bj
(
{sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ
)
for which
by increasing its borrowing beyond the maximum safe level of debt the economy is able to
increase its current capital inflows −qj(S, b′j)b′j .
Following closely the analysis in Arellano (2008) and considering only the case in which
the incentives to default are stronger for lower levels of the endowment, it is possible to
define the conditional default boundary function y∗j (bj | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) as follows:18
Definition 6 The conditional default boundary function y∗j (bj | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) corre-
sponds to the endowment
level y∗j for a given level of debt bj ∈ (bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ), bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ)) that
conditional on the fundamentals of the other economies in the investor’s portfolio, and the
representative investor’s wealth makes the value of repayment and the value of default equal
for the emerging economy: V Cj (bj , y
∗
j , {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) = V Dj (y∗j , {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ).
Conditional on the fundamentals of the other economies in the investor’s portfolio and
the representative investor’s wealth, y∗j (bj | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) divides the space {yj , bj} into
the default and repayment regions. According to proposition 2, proposition 3, proposi-
tion 4 and corollary 4, the conditional default boundary is increasing in the investor’s risk
aversion, decreasing in the investor’s wealth, decreasing in the emerging economy’s assets
and increasing in the overall risk of the investor’s portfolio which is determined by the
fundamentals of the other economies in the investor’s portfolio.
Using the definition of bond prices in equation (10) and the definition of default
probabilities in equation (18), it is possible to show that as in the case of risk neu-
18While theoretically it is possible to have the case in which incentives to default are stronger the higher
is the endowment, the case for which incentives to default are stronger the lower is the endowment seems to
be the empirically relevant case as long as the persistence of the endowment shocks is not excessively high.
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tral investors, the equilibrium bond price qj(S, b′j) is a function of the default boundary
y∗j (b
′
j | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ) and the distribution of shocks. Also, as discussed in Lizarazo
(2010), the bond prices are functions of the investor’s risk aversion γL and her wealth
level W since these variables help to determine both the conditional default boundary
y∗j (b
′
j | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ), and the excess risk premium included in the bond prices. More
important for the study of contagion, the fundamentals of other economies also affect the
bond prices through their effect on both the conditional default boundary, and the excess
risk premium of the prices:
qj(S, b′j) = q
f [1− F (y∗j (b′j | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ))] + βL
[
Cov(vcL(cL
′
(S)), d′j (S))
]
vcL(cL (S))
=
Y∫
y∗j (b′j |{sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W,ψ)
βL
vcL
(
cL
′
(S)
)
vcL (cL (S))
f
(
y′j | yj
)
dy′j .
where F is the cumulative probability distribution of shocks.
Financial contracts {qj(S, b′j(S)), b′j(S)} observed at equilibrium change current con-
sumption by the product −qj(S, b′j(S))b′j(S). As consequence of the result in proposition 4,
the definition of the conditional boundary function, and the definition of equilibrium bond
prices, as debt increases the equilibrium bond prices go to zero. Therefore it is possible to
define the endogenous borrowing limit b∗j (S) as follows:
Definition 7 The endogenous borrowing limit b∗j (S) is the level of debt for which pij ≡
−qj(S, b∗j (S))b∗j (S) is such that
pij = max
b′j
[
−
(
qf [1− F (y∗j (b′j | {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ))] +
βL[Cov(vcL(cL
′
), d′j)]
vcL(cL)
)
b′j
]
.
For any given state S, b∗j (S) is the endogenous borrowing constraint since for any b
′
j < b
∗
j (S)
V Cj (S, b
′
j) < V
C
j (S, b
∗
j (S)), and therefore b
′
j < b
∗
j (S) cannot be optimal.
For any state S, the relevant risky region of the model is limited to contracts with
b′j ∈
[
b∗j (S) , bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ)
)
.
Proposition 8 A necessary condition to observe contagion and default at equilibrium is
that for some state S, the relevant risky region of the model is not empty. In other words,
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contagion and default are possible outcomes of the time series of the model only if there
exists b∗j (S) such that :
b∗j (S) < bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ).
In order to observe contagion and default at equilibrium the equilibrium price function cannot
decrease “too fast” when assets decrease.
Given the speed at which bond prices decrease when the economy’s assets decrease,
the smaller is b({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ), the higher is the chance that there exists b∗j (S) <
bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ). Intuitively, because investors must be compensated in order to induce
them to take some default risk, this risk imposes an additional cost of borrowing for the
emerging economy. For the borrower, the cost of borrowing beyond the maximum safe level
must be paid over the total amount of resources borrowed, and not only over the marginal
amount of borrowing. Therefore, the larger is the base over which this additional cost
of borrowing has to be paid—i.e. the larger is the maximum safe level of borrowing—the
higher is the cost of default risk and the lower is the likelihood that the economy would
ever choose to borrow beyond the safe level of debt.
Lizarazo (2010) characterizes the roles ofW and γL in the likelihood of observing default
at equilibrium in a similar model of endogenous default risk with risk averse agents, and
concludes that such a question cannot be answered unambiguously theoretically. The same
results apply for this model. However, the quantitative results in this article establish that
the possibility of observing contagion and default at equilibrium is largely independent of
the level of wealth of the investor. The possibility of observing default is also independent
of the degree of risk aversion of the investor, as long as the investor is risk averse—for a
risk neutral investor contagion cannot be observed.
Role of {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j in the determination of the existence of b∗j (S) <
bj({sk}Jk=1,k 6=j ,W, ψ). First, corollary 4 establishes that the weaker are the fundamen-
tals of the economies that share the investor, the less the economy is able to borrow and the
lower is the maximum safe level of borrowing. Therefore, other things equal, if the other
economies’ fundamentals are weak, the cost of a change in the price of the bonds is felt over
a smaller borrowing base. In this case, there is potentially more to gain from accepting
a lower price for these bonds in order to further increase borrowing. Therefore this effect
makes default and contagion more likely outcomes of the model.
Second, weak fundamentals of the other economies that share investors imply a larger
overall risk in the investor’s portfolio and therefore imply a larger response of qj
(
S, b′j
)
to
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changes in the borrowing level. Other things equal, the more risky is the portfolio of the
investor, the larger is the excess risk premium that she demands in order to take default
risk.
These two effects go in opposite directions. Therefore, is not possible to establish theoret-
ically how the equilibrium default probability of the model and the occurrence of contagion
responds to changes in the fundamentals of the other economies in the investor’s portfolio.
The numerical simulations of the model performed here suggest that default and contagion
are more likely whenever the other economies’ fundamentals are weaker and default by those
economies is expected.
6 Numerical Solution
As is well known, during 2001 Argentina faced one of the worst economic crisis in its
history. The country was forced to default on US100 billion in external government debt
(corresponding to nearly 37% of GDP) by the end of 2001. The crisis had strong real effects
that extended into 2002: according to estimates by the IMF, Argentina’s GDP fell by 4.4%
during 2001, and by an additional 10.9% in 2002.
Uruguay, on other hand was facing economic problems since 1998. These problems were
aggravated in 2001 by the outburst of cow foot-and-mouth disease which very negatively
affected exports. On top of these preexisting conditions, the Argentinean crisis began,
weakening confidence in Uruguay and prompting caution in consumers and investors. As a
result, real demand fell, prompting an exchange rate depreciation of the Uruguayan peso.
This depreciation generated a significative increase in the public debt to GDP ratio (this
ratio went from 40% to 52%). According to IMF estimates, during 2001 Uruguay’s GDP
fell by 3.5%, and during 2002 Uruguay’s GDP fell by and additional 7.1%. The fall in GDP
in 2002 was due mainly to problems in Uruguay’s financial sector which had strong financial
links to Argentina: in early 2002 following Argentina’s default Uruguay’s financial sector
experienced large dollar deposit outflows (these outflows exceeded 100 million per day in
the month of July 2002), and Uruguay faced a rapid decline in its international reserves
(Uruguay’s international reserves fell from 3 billion dollars at the end of 2001 to 650 million
by August 2002). Signaling the credit risk involved in Uruguay’s external debt, during 2002,
Uruguay’s debt was downgraded by investment rating agencies.19.
19Uruguay’s deposit outflows were initially confined to non-residents but, as a result of problems of two
local banks and the Argentina’s crisis, deposit outflows accelerated in March 2002 and spread to resident
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Table 1: Business Cycle for Argentina and Uruguay 1983:Q1-2002:Q1
Variable mean(x) std(x) corr(x, yAR) corr(x, rAR) corr(x, yUR) corr(x, rUR) corr(x, yUS)
Spread rAR 12.67 5.42 -0.60 -0.44 0.18 -0.11
Trade-Balance TBAR 0.58 1.83 -0.59 0.38 -0.47 0.05 0.08
Output yAR 100 1.91 0.63 -0.24 -0.02
Consumption cAR 78.32 1.94 0.93 -0.78 0.71 -0.63 0.60
Spread rUR 8.53 0.86 -0.30 -0.25
Trade-Balance TBUR -10.67 3.15 -0.26 0.16 -0.48 0.09 -0.17
Output yUR 100 1.64 0.49
Consumption cUR 68.32 2.61 0.55 -0.31 0.86 -0.13 0.42
The simulation of the model in this paper analyzes the Argentinean default of 2001 and
its implications on Argentina’s neighbor Uruguay. Uruguay was the most affected country,
by the spillovers of the Argentinean crisis. While capital flows to Latin America dipped
sharply in the summer and fall of 2001 in response to the crisis in Argentina, by the end
of the year they were recovering despite the expectation of Argentina’s default. Contagion
in the bond market had been significant until October 2001 with spreads throughout Latin
America rising in step with the deterioration of Argentine credit risk. But after October
the spreads in other Latin America bonds declined markedly. By March 2002 as spreads
reached their lowest levels since April 1998, bond issuance remained healthy. Uruguay,
however, with particulary close financial links to Argentina, suffered strong pressures on
its currency. Because trade and financial links between Argentina and most of its other
neighbors remained relatively limited, other Latin American countries were not as affected
as Uruguay.20 On the other hand, and in line with the previously discussed theoretical
results of this article that establish that contagion occurs mainly in those countries with
weak fundamentals, sound macroeconomic management in most of the region increased
confidence of international investors. Finally, an environment of ample global liquidity
favored large and relatively liquid markets such as Mexico and Brazil.
Tables 1 and 2 describe the relevant business cycle features for the periods under study:
Table 1 describes the statistics for the entire period for which data is available; Table 2
depositors. In early August, the central Bank suspended operations of four private domestic banks and
reprogrammed foreign currency time deposits in public banks by up to three years: authorities further
established a fund designed to fully back existing foreign currency sight deposits at domestic banks. These
measures helped to stop the deposit outflows for the remainder of the year. However in January of 2003,
a new round of deposits outflows took place as gross official reserves fell to US540 million by end-February
2003 (equivalent to only half of the domestic reserve liabilities of the central bank)
20Only in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay does Argentina account for more than 10% of
total trade. However, Argentina is not an important market for Latin American exports (1% of GDP of
Bolivia, Brazil and Chile, 2% for Uruguay and 4% for Paraguay).
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Table 2: Business Cycle for Argentina and Uruguay 2001:Q1-2001:Q4
Variable mean(x) std(x) corr(x, yAR) corr(x, rAR) corr(x, yUR) corr(x, rUR) corr(x, yUS)
Spread rAR 22.26 13.59 -0.96 -0.80 0.52 -0.71
Trade-Balance TBAR 2.13 2.11 -0.85 0.89 -0.94 0.58 -0.79
Output yAR 95.6 2.98 0.84 -0.70 0.86
Consumption cAR 76.99 3.71 0.98 -0.99 0.83 -0.60 0.77
Spread rUR 9.53 1.45 -0.81 -0.88
Trade-Balance TBUR -9.30 2.17 -0.24 0.30 0.26 -0.12 0.19
Output yUR 96.50 1.53 0.91
Consumption cUR 100.46 1.88 0.88 -0.77 0.77 -0.63 0.91
describes the statistics for the year of the crisis. For the Argentinean output, consumption,
and trade balance, the source of the data is the IFS. For the interest rate of Argentina the
source is Neumeyer and Perri (2005). For Uruguay, the series for output, consumption and
trade balance are constructed using the Uruguayan Central Bank quarterly and annual data
on indexes and volume for these variables. Also, for Uruguay’s interest rate, the source is
the Uruguayan Central Bank; this rate corresponds to the domestic interest rate in loans21.
The data for the business cycle statistics includes the period 1983:Q1-2001:Q4 for the
all the Argentinean series except the consumption series which is only available for the
period 1993:Q1-2001:Q4. For the Uruguayan series, the period for which the data are
available corresponds to 1988:Q1-2001:Q4 for output, consumption, and trade balance, and
to 1980:Q1-2001:Q4 for the interest rate. Therefore, the business cycle statistics for each
variable correspond to the initial moment in which each of them is available to the fourth
quarter of 2001. The correlations are taken for the common periods in which any pair of
variables are available. Output and consumption for Argentina and Uruguay are seasonally
adjusted and are in logs and filtered with the H-P filter. Argentina’s and Uruguay’s trade
balances are reported as a percentage of their respective output. The interest spread is
defined as the difference between the Argentinean and the Uruguayan interest rate and the
yield of a 3 month U.S. T-Bill.
From the tables 1 and 2 it can be seen that both Argentina’s and Uruguay’s inter-
est rates and trade balances are counter-cyclical, a fact which is well known for the case
of emerging economies. More importantly for our analysis, the interest rates and trade
balances of these two countries are also negatively correlated with their neighbor’s GDP,
and these negative correlations are larger during the period of the Argentinean crisis: the
21While the domestic rate is clearly not the interest rate in international loans, it should be positively
correlated. Unfortunately there is no EMBI for Uruguay. And while it would be possible to calculate an
implicit interest rate from Uruguay’s debt service data, such data is available only annually.
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Table 3: Contagion: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Emerging Economy’s Mean Income E [y] 1
Std. Dev. Emerging Economy’s Income std [y] 0.025
Autocorr. Emerging Economy’s Income Process 0.945
Emerging Economy’s Discount Factor β 0.953
Emerging Economy’s Risk Aversion γ 2
Probability of re-entry τ 0.282
Critical level of output for asymmetrical output cost yˆ = 0.969E(y)
Representative investor’s Income X 0.01
Representative Investor’s Discount Factor βL 0.98
Representative investor’s Risk Aversion γL 2
Risk Free Interest Rate rf = 1
qf
0.017
correlation between Argentina’s GDP and Uruguay’s interest rate for the whole period of
study is −0.24 and becomes −0.80 during the year of the crisis; the correlation between
Uruguay’s GDP and Argentina’s interest rate for the whole period of study is −0.44 and
jumps to −0.80 during the period of the Argentinean crisis. The behavior of the correla-
tions of the countries’ trade balances and their neighbor’s GDP follows a similar pattern to
the one observed for the correlations of the interest rates and the GDP’s of the neighbor
country.
For the analysis here, it is also important to notice that Argentina’s and Uruguay’s
interest rates are positively correlated (0.18) and that this correlation is much larger during
the period of the Argentinean crisis (0.52). Finally, the consumptions in these two countries
are positively correlated with the neighbor country’s GDP and the correlations are larger
during the year of Argentina’s crisis: the correlation between Argentina’s consumption and
Uruguay’s GDP is 0.71 and 0.83 for the whole period and the crisis period respectively; the
correlation between Uruguay’s consumption and Argentina’s GDP is 0.55 and 0.88 for the
whole period and the crisis period respectively.
Given the assumption of the model of identical economies that only differ in the realiza-
tions of their endowments, and in order to facilitate comparison with the previous literature
in the subject, the parameters considered for the simulation are chosen to replicate some
features of the Argentinean economy, and are taken from the calibration for this economy in
Arellano (2008). The parameters related to international investors are taken from Lizarazo
(2010).
Table 3 shows the parameters of the numerical analysis of the model. The mean income
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of the emerging economy is normalized to 1. The coefficient of risk aversion of the economy
is 2, a standard value considered in the business cycle literature. The free interest rate is
set to 1.7%, to match the period under study to the quarterly US interest rate of a bond
with a maturity of 5 years. The GDP is assumed to follow a log-normal AR(1) process
log(yt) = ρlog(yt−1) + εy with E[εy] = 0 and E[εy2] = σ2y . The values estimated by
Arellano(2008) for the Argentinean economy are ρ = 0.945 and σy = 0.025. The shock is
discretized into a Markov chain using the quadrature based procedure (Hussey and Tauchen
(1991)). Following a default, there is an asymmetrical function for the output loss:
φ(y) =
{
ŷ if y > ŷ
y if y ≤ ŷ
}
(21)
with ŷ = 0.969E(y) which following Arellano (2008) targets a value of 5.53% for the average
debt service to GDP ratio. The probability of re-entry to credit markets after defaulting is
set at 0.282, which is consistent with the empirical evidence regarding the exclusion from
credit markets of defaulting countries (see Gelos et al. (2002)), and which following Arellano
(2008) targets a volatility of 1.75 for the trade balance. The discount factor is set a 0.953
which following Arellano (2008) targets a annual default probability of 3%.
The parameters for the international investors are as follows: the representative in-
vestor’s discount factor is set to 0.98. As in Lizarazo (2010), if there were no uncertainty,
the discount factor of the investors would pin-down the international risk free interest rate
(i.e., β
L
qf
= 1 ); however, with uncertainty, in order to have a well defined distribution for
the investor’s assets, it is necessary to have a value of the discount factor such that β
L
qf
< 1.
The value of βL = 0.98 is the highest value in the range commonly used in business cycle
studies of industrialized countries such that for an international interest rate of 1.7% the
asset distribution of the investors is well defined.
Following Lizarazo (2010), the representative investor’s coefficient of risk aversion is set
at 2; the criteria to choose this parameter is to generate a mean spread for model that is as
close as possible to the mean spread in Argentina for the period of study, which corresponds
to 12.67%.
The representative investor receives a deterministic income of 1% of the emerging econ-
omy’s mean income in each period. In Lizarazo (2010) this parameter is set to minimize the
joint deviations between the observed long term excess return of the portfolio of an investor
in sovereign debt markets and the observed sharpe-ratio of such a portfolio. According to
Jostova (2006), if the investment strategy followed by the investor in sovereign debt markets
is an active investment strategy (the adjustment in the shares allocated to risky and riskless
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investments is done based on short term shocks), then the annual average sharpe-ratio and
the annual average excess return are 0.63 and 19.5%, respectively.
The parameter X affects the long term excess return of the portfolio of the investor
and the volatility of those returns through its effect on the extent to which the investor is
able to borrow from international credit markets. Small X implies less possibility of risk
free borrowing by the investors, and therefore more difficulty for them in smoothing their
consumption. As a consequence, investors receive large compensations for making risky
investments, and obtain a large excess return of their portfolio. However, comparatively,
the volatility of such portfolio is even larger. Relatively high volatility of the portfolio
translates into a small sharpe-ratio for the investors’ portfolio. In the data for the portfolios
of the investors in sovereign debt markets, relatively large excess returns and large sharpe-
ratios are observed. It is difficult for the model to simultaneously match these two observed
phenomena: low values of X can generate larger excess returns but predict very low sharpe-
ratios: on the other hand, high values of X can match the sharpe-ratio for the investor’s
portfolio but underestimate the average long term excess return of such portfolio.
6.1 Simulations
By considering the fundamentals of countries that share investors, the simulations presented
here aim to replicate the following observed dynamics of sovereign yield spreads, and capital
flows to emerging economies: i) the sovereign risk premium is high during recessions, or
when the economy is highly indebted; ii) default is observed when the fundamentals of the
economy deteriorate, iii) in periods previous to default, the economy experiences capital
outflows and collapses in consumption, iv) capital flows and domestic interest rates across
emerging economies are positively correlated, and iv) default is more likely to be observed
when the fundamentals of other emerging economies deteriorate.
The model is simulated for two economies, Argentina and Uruguay, that are labeled as
A and U. For each economy the endowment shock is discretized into a 5 state Markov chain
and the asset positon of the economy is approximated by a 75 point grid. The investor’s
wealth level is approximated using a 10 point grid, over which the solution to the investor’s
problem is linearly interpolated.22 The business cycles statistics of the model are derived as
22In both the discretization of the endowment realization and the asset position of the emerging economies
there are important differences with the calibration in Arellano (2008): in that article the endowment
realization has 21 states and the economy’s asset position state variable has 200 states. For a model like
the one here, with two economies, such a dimension in the economies’ state variables is too large: for the
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follows: The model is repeatedly simulated for 20, 000 periods. From these 20, 000 periods,
sub-samples that have economy A staying in the credit market for 74 periods before going
into a default are taken to compute the business cycles statistics of the two economies.
This process is repeated 5000 times, and the busness cycle statistics are the average of the
statistics derived from each of these repetitions.
The business cycle statistics of the data are compared with the statistics generated by
the model. The results of the simulations are shown in Tables 4 for the whole period under
study and 5 for the year of the crisis. In these tables the results of the model of contagion
are compared with the results of a simulation of the model with risk neutral investors that
has the same number of endowment shocks and the same points in the economies’ grid for
their asset position as the model of the contagion.
Table 4 and Table 5 show that in general terms the contagion model fits the business
cycle statistics of Argentina and Uruguay relatively better than the model without financial
links (i.e. the model with risk neutral investors). In both models a default occurs when
economy’s A GDP is on average 5.5% below its trend. In the contagion model, however,
the effects of the default of country A on country U’s business cycle statistics occur even
when on average country U’s income is not below its trend.
In the data, the spreads of Argentina are 12.67% for the whole period, and 22.26%
during the crisis period (i.e., the year previous to a default episode). The contagion model
generates a spread for the overall period of 5.7% and 12.7% for the crisis period, while the
model without financial links only predicts a spread of 4.5% for the whole period and 4.9%
for the crisis period. Unfortunately, regarding the volatility of the spreads, both models
(the contagion and the one without financial links) under-predict this volatility. However
the contagion model matches the near doubling of spread prior to the crisis.
The better matching of the spreads by the contagion model is not the result of a higher
probability of default predicted by this model since both models predict a annual probability
of default of 3.8%. Also, the higher spreads do not imply a contraction in the mean debt
level that the contagion model supports in comparison to the model without financial links,
since both models have an unconditional mean debt level for the whole period of 15.9%, and
for both models the unconditional mean debt level for the period previous to the default
case of two countries, and taking in account the investor’s wealth level a similar realization would imply
(21×200)× (21×200)×10 = 176′400, 000 possible states for the whole model compared to 21×200 = 4, 200
states in Arellano (2008). The version of the model in here has (5×750)×(5×750)×10 = 1′406, 250 possible
states, still a much larger dimension than the model with only one economy and risk neutral investors.
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Table 6: Debt Securities Issue Abroad 1993(Q3)-2004(Q3)
Debt Securities Issued Abroad Correlations
Argentina Brazil Mexico Russia Philippines Colombia Venezuela
Argentina 1 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.88
Brazil 1 0.93 0.91 0.98 0.99 0.91
Mexico 1 0.90 0.88 0.90 0.81
Russia 1 0.91 0.91 0.90
Philippines 1 0.98 0.94
Colombia 1 0.90
Venezuela 1
Joint BIS-IMF-World Bank Statistics on External Debt
episode increases to 20.1%.23
It is also worth noticing that the probability of country U defaulting conditional that
there is going to be a default episode by country A in the sample is 1.24% larger per year.
This result of the model is consistent with the observed downgrading of the Uruguayan
external debt by international credit rating agencies that occurred in light of the events of
the Argentinean crisis. Also, for country U the mean debt level conditional on the fact that
there is going to be a default in the sample is 11.9% for the whole period, and 12.2% for
the year of the crisis, showing that what is going on with country A has important effects
on country U’s access to credit markets.24 This effect of a country’s fundamentals on other
countries access to credit markets can be see in Table 6. Table 6 shows a very high and
positive correlation for the debt securities issued abroad for the group of emerging coun-
tries that include Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Philippines, Colombia, and Venezuela
during the period 1993:Q3-2004:Q3.
Compared to the model without financial links, the contagion model does equally well
in predicting the counter-cyclical behavior of the spreads and the trade balances, and the
pro-cyclical behavior of consumption for the whole period. For some of some of these
correlations, the contagion model does an even better job than the model without financial
links during the periods of crisis . Additionally, the contagion model is able to explain the
correlations between the economies’ fundamentals and the wealth of the investors (proxied
23The larger probability of default in this model as well as the larger level of debt supported at equi-
librium by the models in comparison to the results in Arellano (2008) for a very similar calibration of the
economy might be explained by the results in Hatchondo and Martinez (2006) that suggest that the results
of endogenous sovereign risk models are somewhat sensitive to the solution method employed for the model
as well as the dimension of the grid used to expand the asset position of the emerging economies.
24The larger mean debt level that is observed during the periods of crisis can be explained by the fact
that in order to smooth consumption with lower bond prices the emerging economies are forced to incur in
higher levels of debt during periods of economic distress.
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by the US’s GDP) and the correlations between the fundamentals of the economies. The
model without financial links predicts all this correlations to be zero.
For example, in the data for the period of the crisis, the correlation between Argentina’s
spread and its GDP is −0.90. For this same period, the correlation between the spread and
the output predicted by the contagion model is −0.91; the model without financial links
predicts this correlation to be only −0.20. Regarding the correlation between Argentina’s
trade balance and its GDP, for the whole period in the data, this correlation is −0.59; both
models predict this relation to be negative and around −0.15. Unfortunately, for the period
of the crisis, the correlations predicted by both models do not exhibit the counter-cyclical
behavior observed in the data. One possible explanation for this result consists in that
the agents in the model are doing as much consumption smoothing as possible during the
periods previous to the crisis, while in the data, credit markets begin to close in the periods
previous to the crisis.
With respect to the correlation between Argentina’s consumption and its GDP this cor-
relation is predicted relatively well by both models for the whole period— the correlation
is 0.93 in the data, the contagion model predicts this correlation to be 0.97, and the model
without financial links predicts it to be 0.90—but the contagion model predicts this corre-
lation much better for the crisis period—in the data this correlation is 0.96, the contagion
model predicts it to be 0.99 and the model without financial links predicts it to be 0.68.
Regarding the correlations between the fundamentals of economies A and U, clearly the
contagion model is superior to the model without financial links because as long as the
GDPs of the two countries are not correlated (this assumption allows us to focus on the
role of financial links to explain contagion) the model without financial links predicts the
correlations of the two economies’ fundamentals to be zero.
For the case of the correlations between the GDP of the crisis country (A) and the other
country (U) and the spread of the other country, the contagion model predicts the correct
sign for the whole period for this correlation but largely underestimates it: in the data
the correlation is −0.24 while the model predicts it to be −0.03; however for the period of
crisis the contagion model does a good job at explaining this correlation in the sense that is
consistent with an important increase in the correlation during the crisis period in relation
to the whole period: in the data the correlation is −0.63 while the model predicts it to be
−0.80.
Turning to the spreads of the two countries, for the whole period and during the cri-
sis period, the contagion model is consistent with the observed positive correlation of the
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Table 7: EMBI+ Correlations 1994(Q3)-2000(Q4)
EMBI+ Correlations
Argentina Brazil Mexico Morocco Nigeria South Africa Venezuela
Argentina 1 0.82 0.91 0.96 0.77 0.83 0.92
Brazil 1 0.78 0.83 0.70 0.49 0.85
Mexico 1 0.93 0.56 0.83 0.82
Morocco 1 0.65 0.78 0.90
Nigeria 1 0.49 0.77
South Africa 1 0.79
Venezuela 1
Source JP Morgan
spreads. The model is also consistent with the pattern observed in the data of a signifi-
cant increase in the correlation during the period of crisis. The model over-predicts this
correlation for the case of Argentina and Uruguay: in the data for the whole period the
correlation between the spreads of this rates is 0.18 and the model predicts it to be 0.32; for
the period of crisis the correlation is 0.52 in the data and the model predicts it to be 0.88.
This over-prediction for the spreads of the interest rates of Argentina and Uruguay might
be seen as a failure of the model, however, it is possible to notice by looking at Table 7 that
the correlations predicted by the model are in line with the observe ones for the EMBis+ of
pairs of countries like Argentina-Brazil, Argentina-Mexico, Argentina-Morocco, Argentina-
Nigeria, Argentina-South Africa, and Argentina-Venezuela, whose average correlation was
0.87 during the period 1994 : Q3− 2000 : Q4.
The model is also able to reproduce relatively well the correlations between Argentina’s
and Uruguay’s fundamentals and the wealth of the international investors (which in this
context is proxy by the US’s GDP). For example, according to the data for the whole
period, there is a correlation of −0.10 and −0.54 between Argentina’s spread and US’s
GDP during the whole period and the period of the crisis respectively, and the model
predicts these correlations to be −0.34 and −0.80. Also, the correlation between investors’
wealth and Argentina’s consumption for the whole period and for the period of crisis is 0.60
and 0.72 respectively, and the contagion model predicts these correlation to be 0.31 and
0.84. Obviously, as discussed in Lizarazo (2010), the model without contagion links cannot
reproduce this behavior.
In general, the results in here suggest that the framework presented in this paper can
endogenously account for the transmission of crises across emerging economies. Further-
more, the inclusion of financial links across economies improves the quantitative features of
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comparable models of endogenous sovereign risk25.
7 Conclusions
This paper presents a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model of default risk that
endogenizes the role of external factors in the determination of small open economies’ in-
centives to default, sovereign bond prices, capital flows, and default episodes.
The empirical literature on international finance presents evidence that points to a
very relevant role for the fundamentals of other emerging countries in the determination of
sovereign credit spreads and capital flows to emerging economies. The model in this paper
is the first model that endogenously determines sovereign bond prices and at the same time
endogenously accounts for contagion of crises.
The endogenization of bond prices and contagion occurs in two ways. First, the consider-
ation of enforcement problems in sovereign debt contracts allows default risk and default in-
centives to be endogenized; therefore sovereign bond prices can be determined endogenously
by the model. Second, the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion for investors al-
lows for endogenous financial links across economies that share investors. Together, these
two elements build a framework that explains the contagion of crisis. The intuition for con-
tagion is as follows: whenever a negative shock occurs in one country, this shock increases
the risk associated with that country which implies an expected future negative wealth
shocks for investors. Given decreasing absolute risk aversion, investors’ tolerance toward
risk decreases following the wealth shock, leading to a portfolio recomposition. Investors
shift away from risky investments towards less risky ones.
This explanation for contagion is consistent with the observed behavior of international
investors. Investors tend to pull away from other risky countries once one risky country
goes into crisis. A testable implication of this explanation would be to test the correlation
between the size of investors’ losses and the extent of contagion: if the explanation offered in
this article is correct, then a larger shock to investors’ wealth should induce a more radical
portfolio recomposition away from risky investments.
Qualitatively the results of the model are consistent with the empirical evidence of
contagion from Argentina to Uruguay: First, sovereign spreads and capital flows to emerging
25By comparable it is meant models with the same dimension for the endowment shocks and the asset
position of the economies.
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economies are positively correlated across economies. Second, the fundamentals of foreign
emerging economies affect the determination of domestic sovereign spreads and capital
flows. Third, the average financing conditions of an economy are less favorable after other
countries have defaulted.
While the model presented here presents obvious theoretical contributions to the existing
literature on sovereign debt and contagion, the quantitative implementation of the model
faces an important hurdle: the high dimension of the state space in the numerical solution of
the model. In the current model, prices respond very strongly to changes in the economy’s
debt level (i.e. the price function is very steep). Therefore it is necessary to have very fine
grids for the asset position of the economies in order to capture a great deal of the default
action. This need, if satisfied, has an explosive effect on the dimensionality of the state
space of the model.26
26While not explored in this paper, a logical way to reduce the steepness of the price function would be
to consider longer term maturities for sovereign bonds as modeled in Arellano and Ramanayan (2008) and
Hatchondo and Martinez (2009). Bonds with longer maturities should have a less steep pricing function
because investors would care not only about the next period default risk but future period risk as well.
Therefore sovereign bond spreads would be smoother since the spreads might be positive even if there is no
chance that the economy will default in the next period.
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Appendix
The proofs that follow in this appendix are for the case in which the periodic utility function
of the investor’s has a CRRA representation and the probability for any emerging economy
of coming back to the credit markets after defaulting is 0. Using the argument of continuity
of the prices in the investor’s wealth level might be possible to extent the results to the
more general case in which the probability for a defaulting economy of coming back to credit
markets is positive. However, whenever this is not possible, the numerical results of the
exercise in the present article confirm the previous analytical results for the general case of
temporary exclusion from credit markets after a default.
In what follows is important to remember the assumption that the representative in-
vestor does not go short in the emerging economy assets (whenever the emerging economy
is saving the investor receives the savings and invest them completely in T-Bills). This
assumption implies that in equilibrium θ′j ≥ 0 and whenever θ′j > 0 then b′j < 0. Then the
more negative is b′j the more an economy j is able to borrow from the investors.
Proposition 2 For any state of the world, S, as the risk aversion of the international
investor increases, the emerging economies’ incentives to default increase.
Proof. The investor’s value function can be written as
V L = E
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τv
X + θTBt − qfθTBt+1 + J∑
j=1
dj,t [θj,t − qj,tθj,t+1]
 .
Considering the case in which the economy has not defaulted in the current period (otherwise
the investor will not invest in this economy in this period) and assuming an interior solution
for the allocation to the emerging economy j asset
φ
(
θ′j
)
= E
{−qjvc (cL (θ′j))+ βvc (c′L (θ′j)) d′j} = 0.
If the periodic utility of the international investor is of the CRRA type and γL1 < γ
L
2 ,
then there exists a concave function κ (·) such that v2
(
c; γL2
)
= κ
(
v1
(
c; γL2
))
. If θ′j,1 is the
optimal allocation when γL = γL1 , and θ
′
j,2 is the optimal allocation when γ
L = γL2 then it
holds that
φ1
(
θ′j,1
)
= E
{−qjv1,c (cL (θ′j,1))+ βv1,c (c′L (θ′j,1)) d′j} = 0.
φ2
(
θ′j,2
)
= E
{−qjv2,c (cL (θ′j,2))+ βv2,c (c′L (θ′j,2)) d′j} = 0.
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Using v2
(
c; γL2
)
= κ
(
v1
(
c; γL2
))
it is possible to define
φ2
(
θ′j,1
)
= Eκ′
[
v1
(
θ′j,1
)] {−qjv1,c (cL (θ′j,1))+ βv1,c (c′L (θ′j,1)) d′j} < 0.
The last inequality comes from the fact that κ′ (·) is positive and decreasing. The inclusion of
this function in the previous equation implies that φ2
(
θ′j,1
)
is lower than φ2
(
θ′j,2
)
because
κ′ (·) gives little weight to the realizations of d′j = 1, and high weight to the realizations of
d′j = 0. Therefore
φ2
(
θ′j,2
)
> φ2
(
θ′j,1
)
.
The concavity of V L (·) implies that given qj and the risk of default, φ
(
θ′j
)
,(represented
by the expected realizations of d′j) is a decreasing function. As a consequence
θ′j,2 < θ
′
j,1
which in equilibrium implies b′j,2 > b
′
j,1.
Then for any state of the world S, taking as given qj and the risk of default (δj), a higher
degree of risk aversion of the investor results in this agent allocating a lower proportion of
her portfolio to each of the economies’ sovereign bonds. Therefore, when the investor is less
risk averse there are financial contracts that are available to each emerging economy which
are not available when the investor is more risk averse. Consequently given qj and δj
V Cj,1
(
S; γL1
) ≥ V Cj,2 (S; γL2 )
Since the utility of autarky for the emerging economies does not depend on the investor’s
risk aversion, it is clear that if default is optimal for economy j when the state of the
world is given by S and γL = γL1 , then for the same state of the world S, default would be
optimal if γL = γL2 . Additionally, because incentives to default would be higher whenever
γL = γL2 than if γ
L = γL1 , then at equilibrium δj
(
S, bj
′; γL2
)
> δj
(
S, bj
′; γL1
)
. Therefore
qj
(
S, bj
′; γL2
)
< qj
(
S, bj
′; γL1
)
. In conclusion, for all states of the world incentives to default
for each emerging economy become stronger when the investor’s risk aversion is larger.
Proposition 3 Default sets are shrinking in the assets of the representative investor. For
all W1 < W2, if default is optimal for bj in some states yj, given W2 then default will be
optimal for bj for the same states yj, given W1 therefore Dj
(
bj |W2, ψ, {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j
)
⊆
Dj
(
bj |W1, ψ, {sk}Jk=1,k 6=j
)
Proof. From (9) if W1 < W2 then for each economy j taking as given qj and the level
of default risk (δj)
b′j,1 > b
′
j,2.
51
This inequality holds because decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that
v
X +W1 − qfθTBt+1 − J∑
j=1
Dj,tqj,tθj,t+1

is a concave transformation of
v
X +W2 − qfθTBt+1 − J∑
j=1
Dj,tqj,tθj,t+1

. So if θ′j,1 is the optimal allocation to emerging economy j assets when W = W1, and θ
′
j,2
is the optimal allocation to this economy when W =W2, defining
v1 (θj,1,t+1) = v
X +W1 − qfθTBt+1 − J∑
j=1
Dj,tqj,tθj,1,t+1

v2 (θj,2,t+1) = v
X +W2 − qfθTBt+1 − J∑
j=1
Dj,tqj,tθj,2,t+1

then
φ1
(
θ′j,1
)
= E
{−qjv1,c (cL (θ′j,1))+ βv1,c (c′L (θ′j,1)) d′j} = 0.
φ2
(
θ′j,2
)
= E
{−qjv2,c (cL (θ′j,2))+ βv2,c (c′L (θ′j,2)) d′j} = 0.
And because v1 (c) = κ (v2 (c))
φ1
(
θ′j,2
)
= Eκ′
[
v2
(
θ′j,2
)] {−qjv2,c (cL (θ′j,2))+ βv2,c (c′L (θ′j,2)) d′j} < 0.
The previous inequality comes from the fact that κ′ (·) is positive and decreasing. The
inclusion of this function in the previous equation implies that φ1
(
θ′j,2
)
is lower than
φ1
(
θ′j,1
)
because κ′ (·) gives little weight to the realizations of d′j = 1, and high weight to
the realizations of d′j = 0. Therefore
φ1
(
θ′j,2
)
< φ1
(
θ′j,1
)
.
The concavity of V L (·) implies that given qj and the risk of default, φ
(
θ′j
)
is a decreasing
function, and as consequence
θ′j,2 > θ
′
j,1
which in equilibrium implies b′j,2 < b
′
j,1.
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Then for any state of the world S and taking as given qj and the risk of default (δj),
a lower level of investor’s wealth would result in this agent allocating a lower proportion
of her portfolio to the economy’s sovereign bonds. Therefore, when the investor is more
wealthy there are financial contracts that are available to the emerging economy that are
not available when the investor is less wealthy. Consequently, given qj and δj ,
V Cj,1 (S;W2) ≥ V Cj,2 (S;W1) .
Because the utility of default for the emerging economy does not depend on the investor’s
wealth, it is clear that if for some state of the world, S, default is optimal when W = W2,
then for the same state of the world default would be optimal whenW =W1. Additionally,
because incentives to default would be higher whenever W = W1, than when W = W2
at equilibrium δj (s, b′;W1) > δj (s, b′;W2), and therefore qj
(
s, bj
′;W1
)
< qj
(
s, bj
′;WL2
)
.
Then, unambiguously for all states of the world, the emerging economy faces stronger
incentives to default when the investor is less wealthy.
Proposition 6 There is a wealth channel of contagion. Proposition 3 implies that if
economy k which is in the investor’s portfolio defaults in her debts, incentives to default for
economy j which is also in the investor’s portfolio increase.
Proof. If economy k defaults in her debts with the investor, the wealth of this agent
will be (W | dk = 0) = θTB′ +
J∑
m=1,m6=k
θ′m, which is lower than the wealth for economy k if
she decides not to default, which is (W | dk = 1) = θTB′ +
J∑
m=1,m6=k
θ′m + θ′k. Therefore
V Cj
(
yj , bj , {ym}Jm=1 , {bm}Jm=1 , (W | dk=1)
)
> V Cj
(
yj , bj , {ym}Jm=1 , {bm}Jm=1 , (W | dk=0)
)
which implies that emerging economy j′s incentives to default are larger when some economy
k which shares investors defaults.
Proposition 7 There is a recomposition channel of contagion. Whenever the probability
of default of some country k increases there is a recomposition of the investor’s portfolio:
the assets of emerging economies with weak fundamentals are substituted away by the assets
of emerging economies with solid fundamentals or by T-Bills.
Proof. The following is the logical argument that would have to follow a formal proof.
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In impact, an increase in the probability of default of a country k reduces the expected
level of investors’ consumption next period through its negative impact in the expected
wealth of the investors. By Proposition 3 this shock should tend to, other things equal,
decrease the prices of the bonds of all economies in the investor’s portfolio through its effect
in the covariance term of the bond price equation, even if the default probability of any
country j is taken as given.
However, as discussed in Lizarazo (2008), this initial effect on the excess risk premium
modifies the default repayment decision of the emerging economies. Because of the concavity
of the periodic utility of the emerging economies, the impact in the incentives to default of
the initial reduction in the bond prices generated by the expected decrease in the investor’s
wealth is stronger for economies with weaker fundamentals (i.e, those with lower lifetime
utility and therefore larger default probability).
With this in mind, it is possible to label countries as having weak fundamentals if their
default probability at the moment of the increase in the probability of default of country
k is such that δj(S) > δ∗(S), where δ∗(S) is a critical value for the default probability
that separates the group of countries that share the investor between countries which bond
prices respond strongly to the initial shock in economy k and countries which bond prices
do not respond too strongly to the initial shock in k. Those countries for which bond prices
do not respond too strongly to the initial shock in k can be labeled as countries with strong
fundamentals.
Before the increase in the probability of default of country k the investor had an optimal
portfolio allocation with the optimal overall exposure of this agent to risk. Then, after the
shock to country k the riskiness of the current portfolio of the investor is larger to the
optimal one. Therefore the investor must recompose its portfolio moving away of country
k, and those countries which have become significatively more risky than before in response
to the shock in k.
If the investor moves all the resources previously allocated to economy k and economies
with δj(S) > δ∗(S) to riskless assets (i.e., T-Bills), she might end up holding a portfolio
with a risk exposure lower than the optimal. If such is the case, some resources previ-
ously allocated to economy k and economies with weak fundamentals might be allocated to
economies with strong fundamentals (i.e., economies with δj(S) < δ∗(S)).
However, as is shown in Corollary 4 if initial impact of the expected wealth loss is
very strong (either because the investor is very risk averse, or because it is initially poor,
or because she has a large exposure to country k) such that all countries assets respond
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strongly to the shock in country k, then δ∗(S) > δj(S) for all j = 1, . . . , J , and no country
would have strong enough fundamentals that allow it to get capital inflows after the crisis
in k.
Corollary 1 If following a crisis in some foreign emerging economy k the overall risk of
the investor’s portfolio increases, then the incentives to default for all emerging economies
increase.
Proof. The investor’s value function can be written as
V L = E
∞∑
t=τ
βt−τv
X + θTBt − qfθTBt+1 + J∑
j=1
Dj,t [θj,t − qj,tθj,t+1]
 .
Assuming an interior solution for the allocation to the emerging economy j ’s asset
φ
(
θ′j
)
= EDj
{−qjvc (cL (θ′j))+ βvc (c′L (θ′j)) d′j} = 0.
Taking the risk of economy j as given, compare this first order condition for two scenar-
ios: one in which the risk of economy k is relatively small such that Ed′k = 1 − δL versus
one in which the risk of economy k is relatively high such that Ed′k = 1− δH , with δH > δL.
Then it holds that
φL
(
θ′j,L
)
= E|L
[
Dj
{−qjvc (cL (θ′j,L))+ βvc (c′L (θ′j,L)) d′j}] = 0.
φH
(
θ′j,H
)
= E|H
[
Dj
{−qjvc (cL (θ′j,H))+ βvc (c′L (θ′j,H)) d′j}] = 0.
In this case, if the increase in the risk of emerging economy k generates an increase in the
overall risk of the investors portfolio, then it must hold
φH
(
θ′j,L
)
= E|H
[
Dj
{−qjvc (cL (θ′j,L))+ βvc (c′L (θ′j,L)) d′j}] > 0. (A-1)
The previous inequality holds because an increase in the overall risk of the portfolio implies
E|H
[
vc
(
c′L
(
θ′j,L
))
d′j
]
=
∫ [
vc
(
c′L
(
θ′j,L
))
d′j
]
d
(
d′j | d′k,H
)
>
∫ [
vc
(
c′L
(
θ′j,L
))
d′j
]
d
(
d′j | d′k,L
)
= E|L
[
vc
(
c′L
(
θ′j,L
))
d′j
]
Equation (A− 1) implies that
φH
(
θ′j,L
)
> φH
(
θ′j,H
)
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The concavity of V L (·) implies that given qj , and dj φ
(
θ′j
)
is a decreasing function, and
as consequence
θ′j,H < θ
′
j,L
which in equilibrium implies b′j,H > b
′
j,L.
Then for any state of the world S, taking as given qj , and dj , a higher overall risk in
the investor’s portfolios would result in the investor allocating a lower proportion of her
portfolio to economy j′s sovereign bonds. Therefore, when the overall risk of the investor’s
portfolio is low there are financial contracts that are available to economy j that are not
available when the risk of this portfolio is larger. Consequently given qj
V Cj,1 (SL) ≥ V Cj,2 (SH)
Because the utility of autarky for the emerging economies does not depend on the risk of
other economies different to j, it is clear that if default is optimal for economy j if the
state of the world is given by SL, then default is also optimal for economy j when the state
of the world is given by SH . This holds true for any economy j, j = 1, 2, . . . , J , j 6= k .
To summarize, the incentives to default for all emerging economies become stronger when
an increase in the risk of default of economy k causes and increase in overall risk of the
investor’s portfolio.
Corollary 2 For economies with strong fundamentals if the positive substitution effect of
the crisis in some foreign economy k dominates the negative expected wealth effect of such
crisis “flight to quality” occurs.
Proof. If the overall risk of the investor’s portfolio does not increase in response to the
increase in the probability of default of country k, then some resources that are move away
from economy k and economies with weak fundamentals would be move towards economies
with strong fundamentals (i.e., those that in proposition 7 have δj(S) < δ∗(S)).
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